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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress
1
to enact “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.” A modern
definition of the word uniform is “always the same, as in character
2
and degree” and “unvarying,” while a dictionary closer to the time of
the Framers defined the word as “not variable” and “consistent with
3
itself.” Yet the rights and remedies of debtors and creditors in a
bankruptcy case can vary significantly depending upon the state and

1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1881 (4th ed.
2000).
3
NOAH WEBSTER, 2 AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New
York, S. Converse 1828).
2
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federal jurisdiction in which the case is filed. The result is that bankruptcy in the United States is not, in fact, uniform.
There are three reasons for the lack of uniformity in bankruptcy.
4
First, certain sections of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code” or “Bankruptcy Code”) expressly incorporate state law, which is often different
from state to state. Second, courts in different jurisdictions interpret
the same sections of the Code differently. Third, bankruptcy courts
and trustees are authorized to establish many of their own separate
rules and policies, resulting in wide variances in key aspects of bankruptcy practice. And while the Constitution does not require a single
national law on all matters that affect a bankruptcy case, the substantial and widespread lack of uniformity in bankruptcy is not sound policy and does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of uniformity.
This Article will proceed as follows: Part II examines the lack of
uniformity in contemporary bankruptcy practice and shows that
bankruptcy remedies and outcomes are highly dependent upon the
state and federal jurisdiction in which a bankruptcy case is filed. Part
III looks at uniformity as a matter of sound policy and as a constitutional requirement. As part of this analysis, I explore the meaning of
uniformity under the taxing, naturalization, and bankruptcy clauses.
Finally, Part IV considers how the patchwork bankruptcy system revealed in Part II compares to the concept of uniformity set forth in
Part III.
I conclude that direct incorporation of state law in bankruptcy,
the protracted disagreement between courts over fundamental bankruptcy matters, and local rules and practices that make bankruptcy
procedure substantially different from one jurisdiction to another,
violate bankruptcy uniformity. The fact that separate classes of bankruptcy creditors receive different treatment in the distribution of a
debtor’s assets does not violate bankruptcy uniformity. However,
constitutional bankruptcy uniformity is violated to the extent that
parties in a bankruptcy case are subject to substantially different outcomes due to the location where a case is filed.
II. BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM BUT NOT
A. Federal Bankruptcy Power
Article I of the Constitution authorizes Congress to “establish . . .
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United

4

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2006)).
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5

States.” In absence of a national bankruptcy law, states may enact
6
their own insolvency laws. It is the exercise of national bankruptcy
power, not the mere existence of it that gives Congress exclusive right
7
to legislate bankruptcy law. However, when Congress does exercise
the bankruptcy power through national legislation, then, by opera8
tion of the Supremacy Clause, any state laws that have the effect of
supplementing or supplanting federal bankruptcy law are preempt9
ed.
Congress exercised its bankruptcy powers sparingly in the first
hundred years following ratification of the Constitution. Short-term
10
federal bankruptcy laws included the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, the
11
12
Bankruptcy Act of 1841, and the Bankruptcy Act of 1867. Each of
these laws was enacted as a response to specific economic crises, and
13
when the crisis passed, the law was repealed. The first permanent
14
federal bankruptcy law was the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The Act in15
troduced procedures for corporate reorganization and an adversarial system in which bankruptcy referees played an adjudicative function, with the actual process of reorganization left mostly to the

5

U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4.
Brown v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454, 457 (1892) (“So long as there is no national
bankrupt act, each state has full authority to pass insolvent laws binding persons and
property within its jurisdiction, provided it does not impair the obligation of existing
contracts. . . .”).
7
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 368 (1827); Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 199 (1819).
8
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
9
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929) (“In respect of bankruptcies
the intention of Congress is plain. The national purpose to establish uniformity necessarily excludes state regulation . . . . States may not pass or enforce laws to interfere
with or compliment the Bankruptcy Act or to provide additional or auxiliary regulations.”).
10
ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
11
ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843).
12
ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, amended by Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 17, 18 Stat.
178.
13
See, e.g., Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 18 (1995) (noting that the 1841 Act was repealed
in early 1843 after the mass of debtors impoverished by the Panic of 1837 had obtained discharges).
14
ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840
(repealed 1978).
15
DAVID J. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA
58–60 (2001).
6
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17

parties.
A later amendment allowed for consumer repayment
18
plans and gave referees authority to grant discharges.
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code replaced the Bankruptcy Act, and is
19
the current national bankruptcy law. Unlike many federal statutes,
20
the Code is administered by bankruptcy judges rather than by fed21
eral agencies acting through regulations. The Code contains provisions for individual, business, farm, railroad, and municipal bank22
It has been modified many times to address changing
ruptcy.
23
political and economic circumstances. Procedures under the Code
are governed by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which
contain provisions for deadlines, filing requirements, motions and
24
hearings, adversary proceedings, etc.

16

Id. at 43.
Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
18
SKEEL, supra note 15, at 131.
19
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–
1532 (2006)).
20
28 U.S.C. § 152 (2006). Bankruptcy judges are appointed by the circuit court
of appeals that have jurisdiction over the particular bankruptcy court. They are not
Article III judges and serve fourteen-year terms. They may be reappointed for subsequent terms, but they do not have lifetime tenure. Id. See generally Angela Littwin,
The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for
Its Surprising Success, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1933 (2011) (examining at length the
administration of the Bankruptcy Code by judicial process rather than through an
agency).
21
For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code), is administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission through extensive regulations at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228–
229, 249 (2012). In addition, the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693
(2006), is regulated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve through Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205 (2012).
22
Individual debtors may file under Chapter 7, liquidation, 11 U.S.C. § 109(B)
(2006), Chapter 13, adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income, id. §
109(e), and reorganization under Chapter 11, § 109(d). Businesses may file under
Chapter 7, § 109(B); Chapter 11, § 109(d), and cross-border bankruptcies under
Chapter 15, id. § 1501. Chapter 12, id. § 109(f), provides bankruptcy procedures for
family farmers and family fishermen, while railroads may file under a special subchapter of Chapter 11, § 109(d). Chapter 9, § 109(c), is for municipal bankruptcies.
23
For example, § 1113 was added in 1984 to place restrictions on the ability of
business debtors to modify collective bargaining agreements after the Supreme
Court’s decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (holding that the
decision by a Chapter 11 debtor to reject a collective bargaining agreement was subject to the same standards as rejection of an executory contract). Similarly, § 1114
was added in 1988 to impose procedures and restrictions upon the ability of a debtor
to terminate retiree benefits after the LTV Corporation terminated the health and
life insurance benefits of 78,000 retirees immediately upon filing bankruptcy. See S.
REP. NO. 119 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N 683.
24
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007, 9001, 7001.
17
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The essence of contemporary bankruptcy practice is the adjustment of the debtor-creditor relationship. For consumer bankruptcy,
the purpose of bankruptcy is a “fresh start,” which means that the
debtor’s unsecured debts and obligations are completely or partially
25
discharged. The purpose of business bankruptcy has traditionally
been to reduce and restructure debt to allow the business to contin26
ue, but liquidation of assets and cessation of the entity is increasingly common.
B. Structural Cause of Nonuniformity in Bankruptcy
The state in which a bankruptcy petition is filed can be the most
significant variable in determining the rights available to parties in
the case. There are three reasons for this. First, a number of sections
in the Code incorporate state law, particularly with respect to property rights. These laws often vary from state to state. Second, bankruptcy and appellate courts in different jurisdictions interpret the
Code differently. Third, in order to allow bankruptcy law to adapt to
local circumstances, bankruptcy courts and trustees are authorized to
establish many of their own rules and policies. As a result, contemporary bankruptcy practice is a patchwork of inconsistent and contradictory practices in which the state in which a case is filed makes a
significant difference in the rights available to the parties.
1.

State Law Incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code

Bankruptcy law is not intended to be an original source of property rights. Rather, bankruptcy is intended to provide for the modification of property rights that exist under nonbankruptcy law prior to
27
the bankruptcy.
Thus, many sections of the Code incorporate
28
nonbankruptcy law, which means state or other federal law. For ex25
See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt (In re Hunt), 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“One
of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to ‘relieve the honest but unfortunate debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start
afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.’” (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55
(1915))).
26
See, e.g., In re Great Am. Pyramid Joint Venture, 144 B.R. 780, 788 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1992) (holding that the ultimate purpose of a Chapter 11 filing is to “enable[]
the debtor to restructure its pre-bankruptcy debts, pay its creditors, and return to active operation as a viable enterprise”).
27
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979) (“Property rights are created and defined by state law.”).
28
HSBC Bank USA v. Branch (In re Bank of New England Corp.), 364 F.3d 355,
363 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The phrase ‘applicable nonbankruptcy law’ can refer to either
federal or state law.”).
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ample, under § 522, the terms of a pre-petition security agreement
apply post-petition “to the extent provided by . . . applicable
29
nonbankruptcy law.” Section 541(c)(2) provides that a restriction
on transfers of beneficial estates “that is enforceable under applicable
30
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.” Under
§ 365(c), state law is used to determine if a breach of contract occurred pre-petition, which may remove the contract as property of
31
the estate and terminate a debtor’s rights in the contract. Even if
the Code does not expressly incorporate nonbankruptcy law, state law
can still play a role in bankruptcy. For example, consumer bankruptcy rates tend to be higher in states that give creditors greater power to
32
garnish wages.
2. Differences in Case Law Precedent
For many federal statutes, Congress appoints an agency to make
regulations and administer the statute. As noted, Congress has not
done so with the Bankruptcy Code, but has instead “outsourced” this
task to bankruptcy courts. Therefore, case precedent is a major variable in how the Bankruptcy Code works. And this depends upon the
federal jurisdiction in which the state where the case is filed is located.
In most circuits, an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision is
33
heard by the district court. However, as authorized by the Judiciary
Act, some circuits have established bankruptcy appellate panels
34
(BAPs) to hear bankruptcy appeals instead of the district courts. An
appeal from a district court or a BAP goes to the circuit court.

29

11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2006).
Id. § 541(c)(2).
31
Id. § 365(c).
32
See Lars Lefgren & Frank McIntrye, Explaining the Puzzle of Cross-State Differences
in Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J.L. & ECON. 367, 380 (2009). Data suggests that higher rates
of bankruptcy filing in Utah and Tennessee are due in part to those states’ more
creditor-friendly garnishment laws. Id. at 377 tbl.2; see also Michelle M. Miller, Who
Files for Bankruptcy? State Laws and the Characteristics of Bankrupt Households 36–
37 tbl. 2, 39 tbl.3 (Dec. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1983503
33
28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2006).
34
BAPs are currently in use in the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.
Bankruptcy
Appellate
Panels,
U.S.
CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/CourtofA
ppeals/BankruptcyAppellatePanels.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2012). However, not all
districts within those circuits have authorized appeals to the panels, which is required
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6). Laura B. Bartell, The Appeal of Direct Appeal—Use of the
New 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 145, 146–47 & 146 n.14 (2010). The
30
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Rulings from a circuit court are binding upon all lower courts in
35
the circuit. However, precedent from a circuit court is not binding
36
upon any court outside that circuit. Additionally, precedent from a
district is not binding on any other district court. Indeed, the rulings
of district or bankruptcy court judges are not even binding on other
37
judges sitting on the same court.
Because of the decentralized nature of the federal court system,
the same Code section can be interpreted differently by different
courts. Therefore, bankruptcy outcomes can be highly dependent
upon the state in which the case is filed and even upon the federal
district within the state where the case is filed.
3.

Local Rules and Policies by Courts and Trustees

Bankruptcy courts are authorized to promulgate “local bank38
ruptcy rules,” “local bankruptcy forms,” and “standing orders.”
Judges can also require attorneys to follow specific rules in their
courtroom. At the same time, Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 trustees may
establish many of their own policies in administering bankruptcy cases.
i.

Local Bankruptcy Rules, Forms, and Standing Orders

Local bankruptcy rules are district-wide rules that apply to bank39
ruptcy proceedings generally. They are proposed by a majority of
Second Circuit eliminated its BAP in 1999. Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 644 (2002).
35
See Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1460–61
(2010).
36
See id. at 1463.
37
Id. The precedential effect of BAP decisions is unclear. Id. at 1483–85.
38
Bankruptcy Rule 9029(a)(1) provides in relevant part:
Each district court acting by a majority of its district judges may made
and amend rules governing practice and procedure in all cases and
proceedings within the district court’s bankruptcy jurisdiction which
are consistent with—but not duplicative of—Act of Congress and these
rules and which do not prohibit or limit the use of the Official Forms.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9029(a)(1). In addition, Bankruptcy Rule 8018(a) allows district
courts to “make and amend rules governing practice and procedures for appeals . . .
to the respective bankruptcy appellate panel or district court.” FED. R. BANKR. P.
8018(a).
39
FED. R. OF BANKR. P. 9029(a)(1). The authority of a bankruptcy court to establish local rules is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 2075 by which Congress delegated to the
Supreme Court “the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs,
pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in cases under Title 11.” 28
U.S.C. § 2075 (2006). Bankruptcy Rule 9029 allows each district court to “make and
amend rules governing practice and procedure in all cases and proceedings within
the district court’s bankruptcy jurisdiction.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 9029.
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the district court judges in the district and are subject to a period of
40
public review and comment. The rules are then submitted to the
41
judicial council of the circuit for review and, if approved, are pub42
lished by the Office of United Courts. Local rules may supplement,
43
but may not vary or contradict the Bankruptcy Rules.
There are no set guidelines as to what subjects may be treated by
local rules or forms, and in practice they cover a wide range of mat44
ters. For example, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania’s website includes thirty pages of local rules, thirty-six
separate local forms, dozens of general orders and separate adminis45
trative orders, and a forty-nine-page Court Procedures Manual. In
addition, all bankruptcy judges maintains their own separate “Chambers’” website giving detailed instructions for motions, hearings, fee
46
applications, and other procedures in their specific courts. By contrast, the local bankruptcy rules for the District of Massachusetts are
47
whopping 281 pages and include over a dozen standard local forms.
48
Local rules and forms for other jurisdictions vary just as much.
Bankruptcy courts also issue orders known as “general proce49
50
dure orders” or “standing orders.” Like local rules, standing orders
govern procedures and practices in the bankruptcy court. However,

40

28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9029(a)(1).
28 U.S.C. § 2071(c) (2006).
42
§ 2071(d). Links to local rules posted on the website of each bankruptcy court
are
available
at
United
States
Bankruptcy
Courts,
U.S.
CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/LocalCourtRules/
USBankruptcyCourts.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).
43
FED. R. BANKR. P 9029(a)(1).
44
See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., REPORT AND RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES ON STANDING ORDERS IN DISTRICT
AND BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2009) [hereinafter COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE],
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/jc09-2009/2009-09Appendix-F.pdf (identifying twenty-two separate matters addressed by the district
court local rules).
45
The Local Rules and Forms for the Western District of Pennsylvania can be accessed at http://www.pawb.uscourts.gov/pdfs/CourtProceduresManual.pdf.
46
Chambers
Information,
U.S.
BANKR.
CT.
FOR
W.
D.
PA.,
http://www.pawb.uscourts.gov/chambers.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).
47
The Local Bankruptcy Rules for the District of Massachusetts can be accessed
at http://www.mab.uscourts.gov/pdfdocuments/LR_12-09.pdf.
48
See infra Part.II.C.1.iii.
49
See, e.g,, Index to General Procedure Orders, U.S. BANKR. CT. FOR D. COLO.,
http://www.cob.uscourts.gov/gepror.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).
50
Index of General Orders Presently in Effect, U.S. BANKR. CT. FOR W. D. PA.,
http://www.pawb.uscourts.gov/genordere.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).
41
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unlike local rules, standing orders are issued by bankruptcy courts
without approval of the district court judges and without opportunity
for public notice and comment. Standing orders are not published
nationally and are typically found only on the bankruptcy court’s
website. Standing orders’ topics may include forms, contents, and
service requirements for motions for relief, payments to secured cred51
itors, etc.
Individual judges may also issue orders to be followed only in
52
53
their court. Such orders must be posted on the court’s website, but
finding the rules can be difficult if they are posted only on the individual judge’s webpage. To the extent that individual orders are in
PDF format, they are not easily searchable. Furthermore, one
judge’s rules may be very different from those of another judge. For
example, each of the four bankruptcy judges in the Western District
of Pennsylvania has different rules for how motions are scheduled as
54
well as for forms of motions, briefs, and orders. A study of local
rules and standing orders concluded that they have caused “a lack of
uniformity in federal practice, undermining consistency in areas
55
where national rules were meant to provide it.” Even the personal
opinion of individual judges about debtors’ counsel, legal fees, or the

51

Some judges have criticized the use of standing orders on the grounds that
their effect is essentially the same as a local bankruptcy rule but without the procedural requirements of local bankruptcy rules, such as circuit court approval or opportunity for public comment. In re Dorner, 343 F.3d 910, 913 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“[A]dopting local rules through the device of standing orders contravenes the Rules
Enabling Act.”); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Johnson (In re Standing Order), 272 B.R.
917, 923–24 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2001) (bankruptcy courts do not have authority to issue standing orders).
52
Bankruptcy Rule 9029, which directly tracks Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
83(b), provides that “a judge may regulate practice in any manner” that is consistent
with federal law, the Bankruptcy Rules, and the Official Bankruptcy Forms. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 9029.
53
E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–347, § 205(a), 116 Stat. 2899 (codified
as note to 44 U.S.C. § 3501 2006)).
54
See Chambers Information, supra note 46. One judge allows for self-scheduling of
hearings in Chapter 7, 12, and 13 cases, two allow for self-scheduling of some Chapter 12 and 13 actions (but not others), while the clerk for a fourth judge schedules
all hearings regardless under which Chapter the case is filed. One judge requires
self-scheduling of some Chapter 7 and 11 matters but not others, while a clerk for
another judge schedules all Chapter 7 and 11 hearings. Id. The rules for one judge
set forth detailed motion and briefing requirements, including specified form orders, two other judges have less detailed rules, and a fourth has no set rules on pleading. Id.
55
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 44, at 1.
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number of debtors filing Chapter 7 rather than Chapter 13 can shape
56
how judges apply bankruptcy law throughout an entire district.
ii.

Bankruptcy Trustees

Bankruptcy trustees include the United States Trustee, Chapter
7 trustees, and Chapter 13 trustees. They perform administrative
functions and provide organization and oversight to bankruptcy cases. The United States Trustee (UST) is within the Department of Jus57
tice and a UST is appointed in all federal districts. The trustee has
broad duties to oversee and supervise the administration of bankruptcy cases, as well as Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy trus58
tees.
Chapter 7 trustees are private attorneys appointed to administer
59
Chapter 7 cases on a case-by-case basis. They have considerable leeway in how they manage many aspects of a Chapter 7 case, including
the type and form of documentation required for valuation of property, administration of exemptions, accounting for property of the es60
tate, and whether to object to debtor’s discharge.
Chapter 13 trustees are standing trustees appointed by the UST
61
in each district to administer Chapter 13 cases. Their duties include
review and oversight of Chapter 13 plans, receipt of payments from
the debtor and disbursement to creditors, accounting for property of
the estate, and making a final report on completion of plan pay62
ments. Each Chapter 13 trustee has authority to set many of his own
63
policies.

56
Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of
Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 847 (1994).
57
28 U.S.C. § 581 (2006). The six federal districts in Alabama and North Carolina do not have a UST, but are under the Bankruptcy Trustee program.
58
Id. § 586. A detailed description of their function is set forth infra Part
II.C.2.ii.c.
59
Id. § 701.
60
Id. § 704. A discussion of the role and impact of Chapter 7 trustees is set forth
infra Part II.C.1.ii.c.
61
11 U.S.C. § 586(b) (2006).
62
Id. § 1302(b).
63
See discussion infra Part II.C.1.iii.b.
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C. How Bankruptcy Practice Is Not Uniform
1. Consumer Bankruptcy
The objective of personal bankruptcy is to allow “the honest but
unfortunate debtor” to receive a “fresh start,” and not be burdened
for a lifetime with the financial consequences of misfortune and bad
64
choices. A personal bankruptcy is commenced by filing a voluntary
65
bankruptcy petition, schedules of assets, liabilities, income, expens66
es, and other forms. Upon filing the petition, any action to collect
or enforce debt obligations against the debtor is automatically
67
68
stayed. All debtor’s assets become “property of the estate” and are
thereafter subject to court supervision and control until the case is
closed.
In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a trustee is appointed from a panel of
69
local attorneys. The primary duty of the trustee is to secure and sell
70
the debtor’s non-exempt assets and to use the proceeds to pay
71
claims of unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis. The debtor’s re72
maining unsecured debt is discharged. If a debtor is current on his
or her secured obligations, such as a mortgage or car payment, the
73
74
debtor may retain the collateral and continue making payments.
However, if the debtor is in default, the creditor may obtain relief
from stay and pursue whatever remedies are allowed under state law,
75
such as foreclosure or levy and sheriff sale. Some debts, such as
76
77
78
domestic support orders, debt incurred by fraud, and most taxes
are not dischargeable. Although Chapter 7 is often referred to as
“liquidation,” exemptions under federal or state law allow most debt79
ors to keep some or all of their property.
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 279 (1991).
11 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
Id. §§ 521(a)(1)–(2).
Id. § 362(a).
Id. § 541(a).
Id. § 701.
Id. § 704.
Id. § 726.
Id. § 727.
Id. § 521(a)(2)(A).
Id. § 522(c)(1).
Id. § 362(d).
Id. § 523(a)(5).
§ 523(a)(4).
§ 523(a)(1).
Id. § 522(b)(1)–(3).
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A Chapter 13 bankruptcy is also commenced by filing a petition
and schedules of assets and liabilities. The debtor submits a “plan of
reorganization” under which the debtor devotes all of her monthly
“projected disposable income” to repay a percentage of unsecured
80
debt over a period of three to five years. In addition, the debtor
must remain current on any payments for secured collateral that the
81
debtor wants to retain. A standing Chapter 13 trustee is appointed
for each bankruptcy court district to oversee all Chapter 13 cases filed
82
in the district. The primary duty of a Chapter 13 trustee is to receive
monthly payments made by debtors and to distribute the proceeds to
83
creditors as provided under the plan.
In 2004, after decades of complaints by creditor interests that it
84
was too easy for consumers to walk away from debt under Chapter 7,
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
85
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). BAPCPA’s controversial centerpiece is a complex “means testing” formula used to determine
whether the debtor may file a Chapter 7 or if she must seek relief under Chapter 13. Simply put, if the debtor’s gross income is above the
forum state’s median, then the debtor will be presumed to have
86
abused the bankruptcy process if she files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
If the debtor files a Chapter 13, a similar means test is used to determine the amount of the debtor’s “disposable income” that must be
87
paid each month to fund the Chapter 13 plan.
To implement
means testing, BAPCPA introduced new forms for use by debtors to
88
calculate allowable expenses and disposable income.
The Bankruptcy Code as a statute applies to consumer bankruptcy everywhere. But in practice, consumer bankruptcy varies
greatly from state to state. The following will discuss how states differ.

80

Id. §§ 1322(a)(4); 1325(b)(4)(a).
§ 1322(b)(5).
82
Id. § 1302(b).
83
§ 1302(b)(5); id. § 1326(a)(2).
84
See generally Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005) (examining the role
of consumer lenders in enacting stricter standards for discharge of consumer debt).
85
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
86
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2006). Debtors with primarily business debts are not
subject to means testing.
87
Id. § 1325(b)(2)–(3).
88
Form B22C for Chapter 13 debtors is online. BANKRUPTCY FORM 22C (2010),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
BK%20Forms%201210/B_22C_1210.pdf.
81
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Nonbankruptcy Law

A number of Code sections require parties to use the law of the
89
forum state. This Part will discuss how differences in state law can
create different results depending upon where the case is filed.
a. Bankruptcy Exemptions
Every state has exemption statutes under which judgment debtors may shield property from creditors. These can include personal
property and homestead (personal residence) exemptions. The types
and amounts of exemptions available to state court debtors can vary
widely. For example, a debtor in Alabama may exempt no more than
90
$5,000 of value in a homestead, while in New York the amount is
91
$150,000 per individual and $300,000 for a married couple. Massa92
chusetts is far more generous at $500,000, while Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas each have an unlimited homestead exemp93
tion.
There is no homestead exemption at all in Pennsylvania,
although that state, like many others, provides an entireties exemp94
tion.
Exemptions in personal property likewise vary by state. Some
states have liberal personal property exemptions, such as California
95
96
($20,750) and Texas ($60,000 per household), but other states are
more parsimonious. For example, New Jersey has a $2,000 exemp97
tion, and Pennsylvania allows an exemption of $300 plus a family
98
Bible and certain tools.
The Bankruptcy Code also has an exemption schedule, which is
set forth in § 522(d). Federal exemptions include, inter alia, $21,625
for a homestead, $3,450 for a motor vehicle, and $11,525 for household goods, as well as a “wildcard” exemption and partial credit for
89

See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1978) (“Property rights are
created and defined by state law.”).
90
ALA. CODE §§ 6-10-2, -4, -39 (2011).
91
N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 5206 (McKinney 2011).
92
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, §§ 1, 1A (2011).
93
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 222.01, 222.02, 222.05 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. §
561.16 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.2301 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, §
2(c) (2011); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001, 41.002 (West 2011).
94
Under an entireties exemption, property jointly owned by spouses may not be
used to satisfy a debt owed by just one spouse. In re Gallagher’s Estate, 43 A.2d 132
(Pa. 1945).
95
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 703.140, 704.020 (West 2012).
96
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (West 2011).
97
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:17-19, 2A:26-4, 38A:4-8 (West 2011).
98
42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8123–8125, 8127 (2011).
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99

an unused homestead exemption. Although the federal homestead
exemption may not seem lavish compared to some states’, the federal
personal property exemptions are considerably more generous than
most states’.
Section 522(b)(1) permits debtors to choose between state or
100
federal exemptions. However, § 522(b)(2) allows states to “opt out”
of the federal scheme, thereby limiting debtors in those states to just
101
All but sixteen states have opted-out of the fedstate exemptions.
102
eral scheme.
Accordingly, there is a substantial difference in the
exemptions available to debtors depending on the state in which the
debtor lives. A well-off debtor in Texas, for example, where there is
an unlimited homestead exemption and a $60,000 combined homestead exemption, will fare much better in bankruptcy than one in Alabama, where the exemption is limited to $5,000 for a homestead
and $3,000 for personal property, wearing apparel, family portraits,
and books.
Some states have a two-tier state exemption system that provides
one set of exemptions for civil judgment debtors and a different set
for bankruptcy debtors. Michigan allows debtors the choice of federal or state exemptions, but then requires debtors to choose between
103
state exemptions available to all judgment debtors and exemptions
104
available only to bankruptcy debtors, which provide a much more
105
generous homestead exemption.
Michigan’s dual-exemption
scheme has been challenged on the basis of the uniformity clause,
106
with mixed results. West Virginia has opted out of federal exemp99

11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)–(2), (4)–(5) (2006).
§ 522(b)(1).
101
Section 522(b)(2) provides that “property listed in this paragraph is property
that is specified under subsection (d), unless the State law that is applicable to the
debtor . . . specifically does not so authorize.” § 522(b)(2).
102
States that allow debtors to choose between federal or state exemptions include Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin, as well as the District of Columbia.
103
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6023 (2012).
104
Id. § 600.5451.
105
The bankruptcy-specific exemptions provide a homestead exemption of
$34,500 for debtors under the age of sixty-five, and $51,650 for debtors over the age
of sixty-five. Id. § 600.6541(1)(n). The state homestead exemption, on the other
hand, is only $3,500 under § 600.6023(1)(h).
106
Three bankruptcy judges in the Western District of Michigan have reached different results. Compare In re Wallace, 347 B.R. 626 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006) (finding
the dual-exemption scheme unconstitutional for violating federal exclusivity), and In
re Pontius, 421 B.R. 814 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2009) (finding the same scheme unconstitutional for violating federal bankruptcy exclusivity and uniformity requirement),
100
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tions, but also has an exemption statute for bankruptcy debtors and a
107
separate one for civil judgment debtors.
Notably, the former statute provides for a $25,000 homestead exemption for debtors in bankruptcy and allows the full amount of any unused homestead amount
108
to be applied towards other property. This is five times the homestead allowance for non-bankruptcy debtors in West Virginia and al109
most $4,000 greater than the federal homestead exemption.
The debtor’s choice of exemptions may be different if the debtor has moved recently. If a debtor has lived in her state of residence
for less than two years (730 days) before the bankruptcy filing date,
then she must use the exemptions available in the state in which she
resided for the better part of six months (180 days) immediately prior
110
to the two-year period preceding the bankruptcy filing date. In situations in which these timing issues apply, a debtor’s exemptions
111
travel with her, and are, in effect, personal and not geographic.
b. Reaffirmation of Secured Debt
Section 521(a)(2) requires debtors to file a statement of inten112
tion for all property subject to a security interest. The debtor must
state whether she intends to (1) surrender the collateral to the creditor, (2) “redeem” the collateral by paying the fair market value, or
(3) enter into a reaffirmation agreement with the secured creditor to
113
pay the debt.
The debtor must then perform the stated intention
114
within thirty days after the date first set for the meeting of creditors.
If the debtor fails to do so, then the stay terminates and the creditor
115
may take whatever action is allowed under applicable state law.
A
debt that is reaffirmed is not discharged, so the debtor loses the sig-

with In re Jones, 428 B.R. 720 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (upholding dual exemption
laws as uniformity requirement does not exclude state legislation in the area). But
cf., In re Sassak, 426 B.R. 680 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (Michigan debtors may select exemptions from both general and bankruptcy-specific exemptions).
107
W. Va. CODE ANN. § 38-10-4 (West 2012).
108
§ 38-10-4(d).
109
Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) and (5), debtors receive a $21,625 homestead
exemption, and any unused portion up to $10,825 may be applied to other property.
110
Id. § 522(b)(3)(A).
111
Robert G. Drummond, The Exemption Opt-Out: Does It Violate the Constitutional
Requirement of Uniformity?, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 68 (2007).
112
11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A) (2006); BANKRUPTCY FORM 8 (2008), available at
http://www.wiwb.uscourts.gov/fillable_forms/DebtorsStatementofIntention_B8.pdf.
113
§ 521(a)(2)(A).
114
§ 521(a)(2)(B).
115
Id. §§ 362(h), 521(a)(6)(B).
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nal benefit of bankruptcy when she enters into a reaffirmation
agreement.
Whether a debtor will reaffirm a debt is very much affected by
state law. All states permit the creditor to obtain judgment and/or
repossess the collateral if the debtor is in default for nonpayment.
But some states also permit a creditor to repossess for ipso facto
116
(nonmonetary default). Almost all consumer credit agreements list
insolvency or filing bankruptcy as an event of default even if the
debtor is current on payments. In states where a creditor may enforce an ipso facto clause, debtors are far more likely to enter into a
reaffirmation agreement than in states that do not permit ipso facto
default. Thus, in Massachusetts, which prohibits enforcement of ipso
117
facto provisions, reaffirmation agreements are filed in only eight
percent of Chapter 7 cases, whereas in Alabama, which allows repos118
session for ipso facto default, debtors file reaffirmation agreements
119
in approximately forty-three percent of the cases.
Overall, reaffirmation percentages by state correspond closely to whether a state al120
lows enforcement of ipso facto provisions.
ii. Differing Precedent
As noted, the Bankruptcy Code is administered by courts, not by
federal agencies. Because of the de-centralized federal judicial system, the Code is often interpreted differently from one jurisdiction to
another.
a. Chapter 13 and “Projected Disposable Income”
A Chapter 13 debtor is required to devote all of his or her “projected disposable income” (PDI) to payments under a Chapter 13
121
plan of reorganization. There has long been disagreement among

116

A table comparing state ipso facto laws is set forth in DANIEL A. AUSTIN &
DONALD LASSMAN, REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENTS IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY CASES app. F
(2d ed. 2010).
117
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255B, § 20A (2011).
118
See Sumlin Constr. Co. v. Taylor, 850 So. 2d 303 (Ala. 2002).
119
Bankruptcy statistics are compiled annually by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (AO). A table showing the number of reaffirmation agreements by state for 2009 is available online. U.S. CTS., BAPCPA TABLE 4 (2009), available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2009/T
able4.pdf.
120
Austin & Lassman, supra note 116, at 6–8. For a table showing reaffirmation
percentages for 2007 and 2008, see id. app. A.
121
11 U.S.C. §1325(b)(1)(2006).
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courts over what constitutes PDI. Some courts used the “mechanical
application,” which calculates the debtor’s PDI using the debtor’s average monthly income for the six-month period prior to filing the
122
bankruptcy petition. Essentially, this meant relying solely on standardized income and expenses calculations found in Bankruptcy Form
22C. Other courts favored the “forward-looking approach,” which
calculates future disposable income based upon the debtor’s actual
expected net income as shown by the debtor’s Schedules I (income)
123
and J (expenditures). Yet another approach adopted by the Tenth
Circuit was the “rebuttable presumption” approach, in which the sixmonth averaging based on Form 22C was presumed to apply, but
debtors could rebut the presumption by showing the debtor’s finan124
cial situation had changed (using Schedules I and J). The method
of calculation of PDI is vital to debtors as this governs how much they
must pay under a Chapter 13 plan. Due to the lack of uniformity
among bankruptcy courts in calculating this amount, Chapter 13
debtors could fare quite differently depending on where the case was
filed.
In Hamilton v. Lanning, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve
this issue, essentially adopting the Tenth Circuit’s rule that PDI
should be calculated using the six-month averaging as a starting
point, but adjusting for changes in the debtor’s income that are
125
“known or virtually certain” at the time of plan confirmation. However, Lanning has failed to put to rest many of the conflicts over PDI.
First, there are still two formulae for defining PDI for a Chapter
13 plan. For below-median income debtors, § 1325(b)(2) defines
“disposable income” as current monthly income less “amounts reasonably necessary” for the maintenance of the debtor and depend126
ents, but there are no standardized deductions. In contrast, disposable income for above-median debtors under § 1325(b)(3), and for
Chapter 7 debtors, is calculated in accordance with § 707(b)(2) using
standardized deductions and allowing for the deduction of secured

122

This was the rule in the Ninth Circuit. See Maney v. Kagenveama (In re
Kagenveama), 541 F.3d 868, 881 (9th Cir. 2008).
123
This was the rule in the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, as well as in a number
of bankruptcy courts in other circuits. See Hildebrand v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 395
B.R. 914, 922 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008); Coop v. Frederickson (In re Frederickson), 545
F. 3d 652, 559 (8th Cir. 2008); In re May, 381 B.R. 498, 506, 509 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
2008); Kibbe v. Sumski (In re Kibbe), 361 B.R. 302, 307–08 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2007).
124
Hamilton v. Lanning (In re Lanning), 545 F.3d 1269, 1270 (10th Cir. 2008).
125
130 S. Ct. 2464, 2478 (2010).
126
11 U.S.C. §1325(b)(2) (2006).
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arrearages, administrative expenses, and priority unsecured claims.
If these formulae are strictly applied, below-median Chapter 13 debtors may not use any funds for payment of secured arrearages. Yet
catching up on mortgage arrearages is likely the very reason why a below-median income debtor might want to file a Chapter 13, since curing mortgage arrears is not permitted in Chapter 7. This appears to
produce the same types of unintended “senseless results” that con128
cerned the Supreme Court in Lanning. Future cases will have to resolve this issue.
Second, immediately after a judgment was entered in Lanning
on June 7, 2010, bankruptcy courts diverged on their interpretation
of the case. For example, is a debtor required to include social security benefits as income in a Chapter 13 plan? Courts in Idaho, Missouri and Utah, each citing Lanning, have reached different conclu129
sions.
b. Discharge of Unscheduled Debt
Courts are divided over whether debts that are inadvertently
omitted from schedules in a no-asset Chapter 7 bankruptcy can be
discharged. Failure to list a creditor can happen if a debtor loses or
forgets the information. In the First Circuit, if a debtor does not list a
creditor on her schedules and the creditor does not have actual
knowledge of the bankruptcy, the creditor’s claims are not dis130
charged. Other courts take a “no harm, no foul” approach and al131
Given that
low discharge of unscheduled debts in no-asset cases.
many debtors do not maintain organized records and may have forgotten about, or are unaware of debts, this is a significant difference
in the relief available to consumer debtors.

127

§ 1325(b)(3); id. § 707(b)(2).
Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2475–76.
129
In re Thompson, 439 B.R. 140, 142–43 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2010) (stating that social
security income is not used for disposable income or to determine good faith); In re
Cranmer, 433 B.R. 391, 400 (Bankr. D. Utah 2010) (stating that social security income is used to determine disposable income and good faith); In re Westing, No. 0903594-TLM, 2010 WL 2774829, at *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho July 13, 2010) (stating that
social security is not used to calculate projected disposable income, but can be used
to determine debtor’s good faith).
130
Colonial Surety Co. v. Weizman, 564 F.3d 526, 530 (1st Cir. 2009).
131
Judd v. Wolfe, 78 F.3d 110, 111 (3d Cir. 1996); Stone v. Caplan (In re Stone),
10 F.3d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1994); Beezley v. Cal. Land Title Co. (In re Beezley), 994
F.2d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993).
128
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c. Secured Lender Fees for Post-Petition Costs
Whether a secured lender may charge the debtor for postpetition costs, such as filing a proof of claim or other legal fees, depends upon the jurisdiction in which the case is filed. Section
1322(e) provides that where a Chapter 13 debtor proposes to cure a
default under a plan, “the amount necessary to cure the default, shall
be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and
132
applicable nonbankruptcy law.”
At the same time, § 506(b) states
that post-petition interest and costs may be added only if a claim is
oversecured and such fees are allowed by the underlying contract and
state law. Proof of claim fees and other charges can add hundreds of
133
dollars to the amount owed by the debtor.
Bankruptcy courts in
134
Mississippi disfavor allowing fees for claim preparation.
In Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, such fees are recoverable only if the lend135
er is oversecured.
Courts in North Carolina and Florida take yet
another approach, permitting fees for proof of claim preparation and
136
Court policies regarding
other services if the fees are disclosed.
such fees can even differ within a state. For example, a secured lender’s proof of claim fees is permitted in the Bankruptcy Court for the
137
138
Southern District of Texas, but not the Northern District.
d. Dischargeability of Tax Debt for a Late-Filed Tax
Return
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits are split over the effect of latefiled tax returns. Section 523(a)(1)(B) of the Code deems taxes for
which no return was filed, or for which a return was due and was filed
139
within two years of the bankruptcy, nondischargeable.
In In re
Payne, the IRS discovered and assessed the debtor in 1995 for taxes

132

Id. § 1322(e).
See John Rao, “Proof of Claim” and Bankruptcy Fees: Are They Really Attorneys’ Fees?,
29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 2, 12 n.6 (2010).
134
In re Madison, 337 B.R. 99, 105 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2006) (denying fees for
claim preparation because “preparation and filing a proof of claim . . . is basically a
mathematical computation”).
135
In re Burrell, 346 B.R. 561, 568 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006); In re McGuier, 346 B.R.
151, 158 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006).
136
In re Bartch, No. 09–80623C–13D, 2009 WL 3853215, at *1–2 (Bankr. M.D.
N.C. Nov. 16, 2009) (allowing a $350 fee); In re Palmer, 386 B.R. 875, 876 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 2008) (approving a $500 fee).
137
See In re Rangel, 408 B.R. 650, 667 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
138
See In re Allen, 215 B.R. 503, 504–05 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997).
139
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B) (2006).
133
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140

due in 1989. The debtor filed bankruptcy in 1997, more than two
141
years after the tax assessment. The court held that a tax return filed
by the IRS for the purpose of calculating the debtor’s tax debt is not
142
“an honest and genuine endeavor to satisfy the law.”
Thus, it was
not a tax return for tax discharge purposes.
143
The Eighth Circuit reached a different result in In re Colsen.
The court stated that “[t]o be a return, a form is required to ‘evince
an honest and genuine attempt to satisfy the laws. This does not require inquiry into the circumstances under which the document was
144
filed.”
e. Chapter 13 Property Acquired Post-Filing
Courts disagree over what constitutes “property of the estate”
and what constitutes “property of the debtor” after a Chapter 13 plan
is confirmed. Upon the filing of a Chapter 13 case, all property to
which the debtor holds legal and equitable title becomes “property of
the estate” and subject to review and oversight by the Chapter 13 trus145
tee. Section 1306(a) expands upon this by providing that property
acquired by the debtor subsequent to filing of the bankruptcy peti146
tion also becomes property of the estate. But the bankruptcy estate
is not intended to last forever. Section 1327(b) provides that
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan or order confirming the
plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all property of the estate in the
147
debtor.” On its face, this section appears to return ownership of estate assets back to the debtor upon plan confirmation, thus terminating the estate.
Conflicting with this is the Code’s imposition of a number of duties that the Chapter 13 trustee has with regard to property of the estate after plan confirmation. These duties include receiving, depositing, and investing estate funds and accounting for all the property of
140

In re Payne, 431 F.3d 1055, 1056 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id.
142
Id. at 1057; see also Moroney v. United States (In re Moroney), 352 F.3d 902, 906
(4th Cir. 2003) (allowing no discharge for late-filed tax return if the discharge would
abate tax liability that the IRS has already assessed); United States v. Hindenlang (In
re Hindenlang), 164 F.3d 1029, 1034–35 (6th Cir. 1999) (allowing no discharge
where debtor failed to respond to IRS deficiency letters and the IRS assessed a deficiency; this made a tax return useless for tax purposes).
143
446 F.3d 836, 840–41 (8th Cir. 2006).
144
Id. at 840.
145
11 U.S.C. §§ 1302(b)(1), 704(a) (2006).
146
Id. § 1306(a).
147
Id. § 1327(b).
141
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148

the estate. This is the extent to which § 1327(b) vests ownership in
149
the debtor.
Bankruptcy courts employ no fewer than five different approaches to this issue. On one extreme is the “estate termination”
rule, whereby the Chapter 13 debtor’s bankruptcy estate is deemed to
terminate upon confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan and § 1306(a)
150
simply ceases to be operative. The Ninth Circuit BAP has adopted
151
this rule. The opposite extreme is the “estate preservation” model,
under which § 1327(a) is largely ignored and all property remains in
the Chapter 13 estate until either discharge, dismissal, or conver152
sion.
A third method is the “estate transformation” approach, which
“holds that only property necessary for the execution of the plan remains property of the estate after confirmation, and the remaining
non-essential property becomes property of the debtor at confirma153
154
tion.” The Eleventh Circuit has adopted this approach.
The First and Eighth Circuits use a different rule, known as the
“reconciliation approach.” Under this rule, existing property vests in
the debtor upon plan confirmation, but property acquired after confirmation is used to fund the Chapter 13 estate, which continues until
155
the case is discharged, converted, or dismissed.
The Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Texas has articulated a fifth approach, which modifies the reconciliation approach by vesting absolute ownership of all estate property in the debtor immediately upon
plan confirmation, but bars the debtor from enjoying this right until
156
she has completed her obligations under the plan. Thus, the bank-

148

Id. §§ 345(a), 347(a), 704(a), 1302(b)–(c).
Id. § 1327(b).
150
In re Jones, 420 B.R. 506, 514 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009).
151
Id.
152
In re Fisher, 198 B.R. 721, 724–25 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), rev’d, 203 B.R. 958
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997).
153
In re Rodriguez, 421 B.R. 356, 376 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
154
Telfair v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 216 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th Cir. 2000).
155
See Barbosa v. Solomon, 235 F.3d 31, 36–37 (1st Cir. 2000); Sec. Bank of Marshalltown v. Neiman, 1 F.3d 687, 689 (8th Cir. 1993). The Eleventh Circuit may also
be moving towards this rule. See Waldron v. Brown (In re Waldron), 536 F.3d 1239,
1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that property acquired post-confirmation remains in
the estate with pre-confirmation assets that are essential to the plan until the case is
closed).
156
Woodward v. Taco Bueno Rests., Inc., No. 4:05-CV-804-Y, 2006 WL 3542693, at
*8–9 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2006).
149
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ruptcy estate continues to exist until the debtor has made all plan
157
payments and is entitled to a discharge.
f.

No-Discharge Chapter 13

While most debtors file bankruptcy in order to obtain a discharge, some chapter 13 cases are filed by debtors who are neither
seeking nor qualify for a discharge. A debtor is ineligible for a Chapter 13 discharge if she received a discharge via Chapter 7 within four
years prior to filing or a discharge in Chapter 13 within two years pri158
or to filing. Yet the debtor may still want to file under Chapter 13
in order to strip off a wholly unsecured residential mortgage or modi159
fy other debt, which is not allowed under Chapter 7.
Bankruptcy
courts appear split on whether to allow a debtor to file a Chapter 13
for the sole purpose of lien modification when the debtor cannot ob160
tain a discharge.
No circuit court has addressed this issue, and
there appears to be no particular pattern indicating how courts make
this determination.
iii. Local Practice Differences
a.

Local Bankruptcy Rules, Standing Orders, and
Individual Judicial Policies

Bankruptcy courts may supplement the Federal Bankruptcy
Rules with their own local bankruptcy rules. Courts do so to varying
degrees. The Southern District of Alabama Local Rules consist of
eight pages, while the local bankruptcy rules for Massachusetts span
281 pages, including procedures and forms for almost every aspect of
bankruptcy. For example, under the Massachusetts rules, at least seven days before filing a motion for relief from stay in a Chapter 13,
case counsel for the creditor must confer with debtor’s counsel to resolve or narrow any disputes at issue in the motion and must file a

157

Id. at *9.
11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(1)–(2) (2006).
159
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 429–30 (1992).
160
Compare In re Fisette, 455 B.R. 177, 182 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011), In re Waterman,
No. 11–cv–00929–CMA, 2012 WL 872623, at *4 (D Colo. Mar. 13, 2012), In re Fair,
450 B.R. 853, 856 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2011); In re Davis, 447 B.R. 738, 744–45 (Bankr.
D. Md. 2011), In re Tran, 431 B.R. 230, 233–37 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010), and, In re
Grignon, No. 10–34196–tmb13, 2010 WL 5067440, at *4 (Bankr. D. Or. Dec. 7,
2010), with In re Gerardin, 447 B.R. 342, 347–48 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011), In re Mendoza, No. 09–22395 HRT, 2010 WL 736834, at *4 (Bankr. D. Colo. Jan. 21, 2010), In re
Fenn, 428 B.R. 494, 500–01 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010), and In re Jarvis, 390 B.R. 600,
605–06 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008).
158
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161

certificate to this effect along with the motion. The motion must be
162
accompanied by a local form “Real Estate Worksheet,” and if the
debtor opposes the motion, she must file a local form “Schedule of
163
Payments in Dispute in response to the motion.”
The Southern
District of Florida Local Bankruptcy Rules, totaling 150 pages, also
supplement the federal bankruptcy rules on a wide range of issues,
including detailed procedures for valuation of collateral and objec164
tions to valuation.
South Carolina’s local rules require use of a local form for lien
165
avoidance in Chapter 13 and form of notice for Chapter 13 plan
166
modifications.
Michigan local rules require, inter alia, supplemental information for Chapter 13 plan confirmation, including directions to the trustee regarding the treatment of executory contracts, details on curing deficiencies, and a plain language
167
explanation of dividends to unsecured creditors.
Many courts re168
quire debtors to use a local form for Chapter 13 plans. This has resulted in such a multiplicity of forms that bankruptcy counsel for the
National Association of Attorneys General has called for the adoption
of a single national Chapter 13 form to alleviate the “glaring lack of
169
uniformity within the existing [bankruptcy] system.”
170
In Oregon there is a Chapter 13 trustee in Portland and one in
171
Eugene.
Each has different requirements for plan confirmation
172
which are set forth in the local rules. Wyoming’s local rules specify
161
D. MASS. LOCAL BANKR. app. 1, R. 13-16-1(a)(1), (3). The certificate is not required if the debtor assents to the motion or surrenders the collateral in her Chapter
13 plan.
162
D. MASS. LOCAL BANKR, R. 13-16-1(d); D. MASS. LOCAL BANKR, LOCAL FORM 13.
163
D. MASS. LOCAL BANKR., R. 13-16-1(e); D. MASS. LOCAL BANKR, LOCAL FORM 14.
164
S.D. FLA. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-3.
165
S.C. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1.
166
S.C. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-2(a)– (b).
167
MICH. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(a)(1)–(9).
168
See, e.g., DEL. LOCAL BUS. FORM 103a (Chapter 13 Plan Analysis); DEL. LOCAL
BUS. FORM 103 (Chapter 13 Plan); MASS. LOCAL BUS. FORM 3; E.D. MO. LOCAL BUS.
FORM 13; N.J. LOCAL BUS. FORM. 8; OR. LOCAL BUS. FORM 1300.
169
Karen Cordry, It’s Time for Real Uniformity: The Need for a Nationwide Chapter 13
Plan, AM. BANKR. INST., Apr. 2011, at 76.
170
See Welcome to Wayne Godare’s Chapter 13 Website, PORTLAND13.COM,
http://www.portland13.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).
171
See
Fred
Long,
Chapter
13
Trustee,
13NETWORK.COM,
http://www.13network.com/trustees/eug/eughome.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).
172
Or. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-3(1) (requiring the debtor to submit a proposed
confirmation order in text-based PDF format at least seven days prior to the meeting
of creditors for cases administered in the Portland Office); id. 3015-3(2) (containing
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that a Chapter 13 debtor may not incur new or additional debt without fourteen days prior written notice to the trustee, except that if
debt must be incurred in an emergency, the debtor must, within
fourteen days, provide notice along with an explanation of the cir173
cumstances. The local rules for the District of Hawaii include definitions and procedures for “plan motions” in Chapter 13. These deal
primarily with treatment of secured collateral in Chapter 13 and require the debtor to provide additional notice to creditors if the plan
174
proposes treatment “arguably contrary to the Bankruptcy Code.”
In addition to local rules, most bankruptcy courts also have
standing orders that deal with a range of matters of special interest to
the court. A standing order in South Carolina, for example, provides
175
for an interest rate of 5.25% for secured claims in Chapter 13.
A
Northern District of Florida standing order sets attorney compensa176
tion in “routine” Chapter 13 cases at $3,500. And a Vermont standing order requires Chapter 13 debtors to make all plan payments
177
through wage withholding. An Oklahoma court has a standing order regarding motions for relief by a creditor from the co-debtor stay
178
under Chapter 13,
and a Washington court has an order stating
that if a Chapter 13 debtor proposes to modify the rights of a secured
creditor the debtor must make all payments through the Chapter 13
179
trustee and not directly to the creditor.
Previous studies have noted the influence of local legal culture
180
on the practice of law.
This effect is certainly felt in bankruptcy.
Consider, for example, reaffirmation in consumer bankruptcy cases.
Some judges will not approve a reaffirmation agreement for pro se
detailed specialized provisions governing plan objections for cases administered in
the Eugene Office).
173
WYO. LOCAL BANKR. R. 2083-1(B).
174
HAW. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(e)(1).
175
Bankr. D. S.C., Amended Operating Order 09-02 (Nov. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.scb.uscourts.gov/pdf/oporder/opor09-02.pdf.
176
Bankr. N.D. Fla., Fifth Amended Standing Order 9 (Oct. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.flnb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/standing_orders/standing_orders_
summary.pdf.
177
Bankr. D. Vt., Standing Order 10-03 (Sept. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.vtb.uscourts.gov/orders/ord10-03.pdf.
178
Bankr. N.D. Okla., General Order 10-GO-01, Amending Local Bankruptcy
Rule
4001-1(D)
(Feb.
18,
2010),
available
at
http://www.oknb.uscourts.gov/ClerksOffice/Rules/General%20Orders/10-GO01.pdf.
179
Bankr. E.D. Wash., General Order 10-04 (Dec. 6, 2012), available at
http://www.waeb.uscourts.gov/GeneralOrders/GO-2010.10-04.1288991798.pdf.
180
See, e.g., Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 56.
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debtors or where the debtor’s expenses appear to exceed her income
if the creditor does not offer more favorable terms in the reaffirma181
tion than those provided in the original agreement.
Two Arizona
bankruptcy judges require pro se debtors to complete a special ques182
tionnaire, and another court website includes a link to a talk given
183
by a judge that counsels debtors regarding reaffirmation.
b. Chapter 13 Trustees Procedures
Chapter 13 cases are administered by standing Chapter 13 trus184
tees appointed in each district by the United States Trustee, except
for Alabama and North Carolina, which are under the Bankruptcy
185
The duties of the Chapter 13 trustee are
Administrator Program.
186
set forth in a statute.
These include accounting for property received and distributing payments to creditors, investigating the financial affairs of the debtor (including reviewing the debtor’s petition,
187
schedules, and other documents ); convening meetings of credi188
tors; appearing in the case and filing and participating in motions,
objections, and other proceedings; ensuring the debtor is making
189
payments; and making a final report on the case for the court.
Chapter 13 trustees are not U.S. government employees, and
each Chapter 13 office and staff is managed independently by the
Chapter 13 trustee under the supervision of the UST or Bankruptcy
Administrator. As a result, rules and practices established by trustees
can vary widely. For example, of the ninety-four bankruptcy districts
181
Austin & Lassman, supra note 116, at 9. Such terms may include a lower interest rate, reamortization, reduction of the principal amount to reflect the current fair
market value of a car, or elimination of late charges and penalties. Arizona and Oregon are notable for this.
182
Id. at app. J; see also Joseph C. McDaniel, An Explanation of Reaffirmation in Bankruptcy Cases, and Why You Don’t Want the Judge to Approve the Reaffirmation Agreement on
Your Car, ARIZ. BANKR. ATT’Y BLOG (Mar. 27, 2011, 11:01 PM),
http://www.arizonabankruptcyblog.info/2011/03/nice-explanation-of-reaffirmationin.html.
183
The Honorable Eileen W. Hollowell Discusses Reaffirmation, U.S. BANKR. CT. FOR
D.ARIZ., http://www.azb.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?PID=84 (last visited Apr. 27,
2012).
184
28 U.S.C. § 586(b) (2006).
185
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 302(d)(3)(I), 100 Stat. 3119, 3123 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
186
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 13 STANDING TRUSTEES 3-1
(1998).
187
Id. at 4-1.
188
Id. at 5-1.
189
Id. at 3-1.
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(including Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia), trustees in six190
ty-five districts provide a form Chapter 13 plan for use by debtors,
and many districts have other local forms for use in Chapter 13 cas191
es.
Another difference is the fees charged by the trustee. A Chapter
13 trustee’s office is funded by a percentage of the payments received
192
from each debtor.
The fee is capped by the Code at ten percent,
but each trustee decides how much below the cap to charge as a
193
commission, subject to approval by the U.S. Attorney General.
Rates charged by Chapter 13 trustees vary by jurisdiction from three
194
Unless otherwise directed by the United
percent to ten percent.
States Trustee, rates do not have to be the same even among trustees
in the same district. Since the commission collected by the trustee is
deducted from the funds distributed to creditors, the rate charged by
a trustee is an important component of how much each creditor will
receive under the plan.
Some debtors may wish to pay secured debt, such as a mortgage,
outside the plan, thereby avoiding the trustee’s commission. Whether a debtor may do so depends on the policies of individual Chapter
13 trustees. In Massachusetts and the Northern District of Illinois, for
example, secured debt is typically paid outside the plan, but in the
Western District of Pennsylvania, secured debt must be paid within
195
the plan. Debtors in the Southern District of Indiana and Southern
District of Ohio can make mortgage payments outside the plan unless
196
there is an arrearage as of the petition date. In contrast, the trustee
for the Northern District of Indiana requires debtors to pay mortgage
debt in the plan unless the plan provides for 100% payment to unse197
cured creditors and there is no mortgage arrearage. The Southern

190
See, e.g., U.S. Bankr. Ct., S. D. of Cal. Chapter 13 Plan (Recommended Form),
available at http://www.casb.uscourts.gov/html/csdforms/Chapter13Plan.pdf.
191
See, e.g., U.S. Bankr. Ct., W. D. of Ky., Local Form Q, Certification of Plan
Completion
and
Request
for
Discharge,
available
at
http://www.kywb.uscourts.gov/fpweb/pdf/local_form_q_fillable.pdf.
192
28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
193
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 186, at 11-1.
194
See SCHEDULE OF ACTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES OF ADMINISTERING A CHAPTER
13 PLAN (2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/
20120501/bci_data/docs/ch13_exp_mult.xls
195
W.D. PA. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1; W.D. PA. LOCAL BUS. FORM 10.
196
Bankr. S.D. Ind., General Order 09-0005 (Aug. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.insb.uscourts.gov/WebForms/genorder/090005.pdf; S.D. Ohio LOCAL
BANKR. R. 3015-1(d)(1).
197
There is no written rule for this, but it is customary local practice.
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District of Georgia and Western District of Kentucky allow debtors to
pay the current payments outside the plan, but mortgage arrearages
198
must be paid through the plan. In Oregon, the debtor is required
to pay within the plan, but may request the trustee to waive this re199
quirement.
Clearly, the commission rate and whether payments are made in
or outside a plan can greatly affect how much a debtor pays, how
much creditors will receive, and, in some cases, whether a proposed
plan is even feasible. As for the plans themselves, some districts use
“pool” plans and some use “percent payment” plans. A “pool” plan
looks to the total amount the debtor pays into the plan and deducts
attorney fees, administrative costs, and unsecured priority payments
200
from this. Any money left over is paid to unsecured creditors.
In
contrast, courts requiring a “percentage payment” plan look to the
percentage of payment to unsecured creditors, which must be dis201
closed in the plan. If the plan does not pay a specified percentage,
then the plan (and the debtor’s expenses) will be subject to greater
202
scrutiny by the court.
Another difference is the manner in which plan payments are
made. Section 1325(c) of the Code authorizes the court to order the
debtor’s employer to deduct the amount from the debtor’s paycheck
203
and forward the payments directly to the trustee. Local bankruptcy
rules in the Western District of Pennsylvania and the Southern District of Ohio require the debtor to submit a wage attachment or pay204
roll deduction order along with the plan.
The local rules for the
Western District of Kentucky do not require wage attachment, but the
205
Chapter 13 trustee does.
In Oregon, the debtor must propose a
198
See, e.g., CHUCK SYDENSTRICKER, CHAPTER 13 RECOMMENDED PRACTICES IN THE
WESTERN
DISTRICT
OF
KENTUCKY
2
(2008),
available
at
http://www.louchapter13.com/Images/Chapter13Practices.pdf.
199
OR. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(7).
200
See, e.g., E.D. KY. LOCAL BUS. FORM 2.
201
See, e.g., SYDENSTRICKER, supra note 198, at 4.
202
In the Western District of Kentucky, if the plan proposes to pay unsecured
creditors less than seventy percent, the debtor must appear in person for a plan confirmation hearing. If the plan pays more than seventy percent, it will be confirmed
without a separate hearing. Id.
203
The Chapter 13 Handbook asserts that a debtor is more likely to successfully
complete a plan if payments are made through voluntary wage orders and encourages such orders “in all cases where appropriate.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note
186, at 6-6. I am unaware of any studies or evidence that actually support this.
204
W.D. PA. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-2; S.D. OHIO LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(e).
205
See
Chapter
13
Attorney
Top
10
List,
LOUCHAPTER13.COM,
http://www.louchapter13.com/Top_Ten/Top_Ten.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).
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payroll deduction order within seven days of the meeting of creditors,
but at the meeting of creditors, may request the trustee to waive the
206
wage attachment requirement.
In contrast, neither the Northern
District of Illinois, the District of New Jersey, nor the Middle District
of Tennessee requires payroll deduction.
In most districts, the Chapter 13 trustee relies upon debtors and
attorneys to provide an appropriate valuation for personal property
listed on Schedule B. The Chapter 13 trustee in the Western District
of Kentucky (Louisville Division), however, contracts with an appraiser to inspect the debtor’s personal property. The appraisal is filed on
the docket in the debtor’s case, and the cost of the appraisal is
207
charged as an administrative claim against the bankruptcy estate.
Chapter 13 trustees provide online access to payment history,
debt balances, and other information for each Chapter 13 case.
Generally, only bankruptcy attorneys or other authorized persons
may obtain a username and password to access this information, but
specific rules governing access are up to the trustee. There are at
least four proprietary websites that host this data, and it is up to the
208
trustee to select which site her office will use.
The Bankruptcy Code permits debtors to deduct charitable contributions from income for determining eligibility to file a Chapter
209
210
7 and for calculating “disposable income” in Chapter 13. Chapter
13 and Chapter 7 trustees can set their own requirements for documenting charitable contributions before the trustee allows the deduction. For example, some trustees require documentation of charitable contributions for one year, while others allow proof of payments

206

Or. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(b)(2).
See, e.g., Appraisal. (Anderson, CPA, Randall), In re O’Neal, No. 08-35278
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Jan. 1, 2009), ECF Nos. 12 and 13.
208
See
Welcome
to
the
13Network,
BANKR.
SOFTWARE
SPECIALISTS,
http://www.13network.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2012); Exclusive Source of Consolidated
Chapter 13 Case and Claims Data, NAT’L DATA CENTER, https://www.13datacenter.com
(last visited Apr. 27, 2012); Chapter 13 Trustee Online Case Status System,
TRUSTEE13.COM, http://www.trustee13.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2012); Home Page,
BANKR. LINK, http://www.bankruptcylink.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).
209
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2006) (“In making a determination whether to dismiss
[for bankruptcy abuse] the court may not take into consideration whether a debtor
has made or continues to make, charitable contributions . . . .”).
210
Section 1325(b)(2)(A)(ii) allows charitable contributions up to fifteen percent
of gross annual income to be deducted from the debtor’s “disposable income” for
determining the amount that must be paid into a Chapter 13 plan each month. Id.
1325(b)(2)(A)(ii).
207
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211

for a much shorter period. Some trustees receive statements directly from the organization, and others will accept evidence from the
212
debtor, such as cancelled checks. Other trustee offices have more
detailed policies. In the Western District of Kentucky, if the monthly
charitable contribution is $200 or less, no further evidence is re213
quired. If the contribution is more than $200, the trustee requires
214
a copy of the debtor’s Schedule A of the prior-year tax return. But
if the debtor claims a monthly contribution amount of over $400, the
trustee requires an on-going quarterly statement from the organiza215
tion receiving the contribution.
If the trustee does not get this
documentation after the plan has been confirmed, then he will file a
motion to increase the plan payment by the amount claimed as a
216
charitable contribution.
There are no specific rules or guidelines
for documenting charitable contributions, and each trustee determines her own policies.
c. Chapter 7 Trustees
Chapter 7 cases are administered by a Chapter 7 “panel” trustee.
Section 701(a)(1) provides that “promptly after the order for relief,
the United States trustee shall appoint one disinterested person that
is a member of the panel of private trustees established under section
217
586(a)(1) of title 28.” The main duty of the trustee is to collect and
liquidate property of the estate and to distribute the proceeds to
218
creditors. The trustee’s specific duties include reviewing the debt219
or’s petition, schedules, and other bankruptcy documents; conven220
ing and conducting the “meeting of creditors”; collecting and liquidating non-exempt assets and accounting for the property
221
222
received; objecting to exemptions; opposing the discharge of the

211

Email from Lydia S. Meyer, Chapter 13 Trustee, N.D. of Ill., to author (Mar.
23, 2011, 4:03 EST) (on file with author).
212
Id.
213
SYDENSTRICKER, supra note 198, at 2.
214
Id.
215
Email from Chuck Sydenstricker, Office of Chapter 13 Trustee, W.D. of Ky, to
author (Mar. 23, 20122, 4:55 EST)(on file with author).
216
Id.
217
11 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)(2006).
218
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES 6-1 (2001).
219
Id. at 6-5, 6-8.
220
11 U.S.C. § 341(a) (2006).
221
Id. § 704(a)(1)–(2).
222
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b).

AUSTIN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/17/2012 5:40 PM

MYTH OF “UNIFORM LAWS”
223

1111
224

debtor when appropriate; reviewing the debtor’s attorney’s fees;
225
reviewing the case for “substantial abuse”; and filing a final report
226
and accounting.
For administering a no-asset Chapter 7 case, the
227
trustee receives sixty dollars.
Chapter 7 trustees have considerable discretion in how they administer bankruptcy cases. For example, a Chapter 7 debtor must file
financial information such as schedules of assets, liabilities, income,
228
and expenses. The trustee may determine what type of evidence, if
any, must be provided to document these figures. This can include
tax returns, business financial statements, loan documents, deeds, ti229
tles, insurance policies, and wage and bank statements.
As noted, § 707(b)(1) permits a Chapter 7 debtor to claim a deduction for charitable contributions to a “qualified religious or chari230
table entity.”
The Code does not state for how long the debtor
must have been making the contributions prior to filing. Some
Chapter 7 trustees simply never question whether the debtor has
made such contributions in the past, interpreting the purpose of the
provision and the “fresh start” objective of Chapter 7 to allow the
contribution. Other trustees may insist that the payments have been
made for a year or longer, and require documentation such as cancelled checks, a copy of IRS Schedule A (if the debtor itemizes deductions), or a letter or some other proof from the charitable organization.
Valuation of the debtor’s property is an issue in many Chapter 7
cases, particularly if it appears that the debtor has neared or exceeded her exemptions. The Chapter 7 Handbook states that “value can
231
be determined in a variety of ways.” In a no-asset case, trustees generally accept the Schedule B valuations for smaller items of personal
property, such as clothing, appliances, and household goods. The
223

Id. § 704(a)(6). Grounds for opposing discharge include, inter alia, abuse of
the bankruptcy process and failure to disclose assets. Id.
224
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 6-9.
225
Id. at 6-11 to 6-13. Under section 707(b) of the Code, the bankruptcy court,
after notice and hearing, must dismiss the debtor’s petition if it is found that granting relief would be an abuse of Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Id. at 707(b).
226
Id. § 704(a)(9).
227
Id. § 330(b).
228
Id. § 521(a)(1)(A)–(B).
229
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 7-1.
230
Id. § 707(b)(1). The deduction is listed on Schedule J, Line 10.
231
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 8-3. Examples provided in the Handbook include the pay-off statement, price lists, physical inspections, appraisals, and
“common sense.” Id.
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trustee may be more likely to require a third-party valuation for
unique items such as antiques or original artwork, or for the debtor’s
interest in a business. However, there is no standard policy or method, and different trustees have different policies for whether and how
they will obtain separate valuations for property. For example, some
trustees accept printed real estate valuations from Zillow.com. Or, if
the debtor recently purchased or refinanced the property, the trustee
may accept the loan appraisal. Many trustees, however, will demand
that the debtor obtain a broker’s price opinion or even a professional
appraisal, which may cost the debtor several hundred dollars to ob232
tain.
For the valuation of motor vehicles, most Chapter 7 trustees
accept printouts from online valuation services, such as NADA or
Kelly Blue Book, but some trustees require the debtor to bring her
233
vehicle to a designated appraiser for valuation.
d. Bank Practices
Section 541 provides that all “legal or equitable interests of the
debtor” become property of the bankruptcy estate upon commence234
ment of a case. In a Chapter 7 case, this means that the debtor may
not sell, give away, or otherwise dispose of estate property without
235
approval of the bankruptcy court. Taking this to the extreme, some
banks place a freeze on a Chapter 7 debtor’s bank accounts immediately upon receipt of notice of filing (irrespective of any right of set236
off), until requested by the trustee to release them.
This may impose a serious hardship upon the debtor, who can no longer get
access to her funds for daily personal or family use. The policy is not
237
imposed uniformly, and jurisdictions differ on whether doing so violates the automatic stay. The Ninth Circuit BAP has held that freezing the debtor’s account when there is no contractual right of setoff
238
violates the automatic stay. Other courts disagree and have refused

233
Interview with Donald R. Lassman, Chapter 7 Trustee, Dist. of Mass., Bos. Div.
(Nov. 8, 2010) (on file with author).
234
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006).
235
All of the debtor’s interests in such property remain “property of the estate”
until the trustee abandons the property, a creditor obtains relief from stay as to its
collateral, or until the case is closed. § 541(a).
236
Based on anecdotal information and available case law, it appears that Wells
Fargo is the only national bank that does this.
237
The author’s informal survey of bankruptcy attorneys suggests that this is not
likely in California, Montana, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, but more common in
New Mexico, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington.
238
In re Mwangi, 432 B.R. 812, 822 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010).
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to sanction a bank for freezing the debtor’s personal bank account
239
upon notice of a bankruptcy filing.
2. Business Bankruptcy
The classic model of Chapter 11 is a business using the respite
from creditors under the automatic stay to restructure operations and
240
negotiate a plan of reorganization, often with modified debt or new
241
capital.
The business then emerges from Chapter 11 a more efficient, on-going enterprise with its identity and operations intact.
The traditional model is becoming increasingly atypical, with a
variety of alternatives taking its place. These include “pre-packaged”
bankruptcy (“pre-packs”), in which the debtor has negotiated the key
terms of a bankruptcy exit plan with major secured creditors prior to
filing for bankruptcy. Pre-packs now account for up to half of all
242
large Chapter 11 bankruptcies.
Other models include liquidation
243
of estate assets prior to confirmation or pursuant to a confirmed
244
plan. Another variant is a so-called “structured dismissal” in which
the case is dismissed, but where the dismissal order includes provisions such as releases, protocols for reconciling or paying claims, and
245
other terms.
Some bankruptcy courts appoint a Chief Restructuring Officer in cases in which debtor’s management has resigned or is
246
otherwise not capable of managing the affairs of the debtor. Bankruptcy courts have responded differently to these developments, with
247
some courts accepting them wholly, in part, or not at all. Whichever hybrid is before the court, the location of the case can make a con239
In re Young, 439 B.R. 211 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010); In re Phillips, 443 B.R. 63
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2010); In re Bucchino, 439 B.R. 761 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2010).
240
See, e.g., In re Whitaker, 341 B.R. 336, 341 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006).
241
To be confirmed, a plan must comply with the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§
1123 and 1129.
242
Survey Finds Free-Fall Bankruptcies Becoming More Rare, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2011,
4:47
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2011/06/15/survey-finds-free-fallbankruptcies-becoming-more-rare/tab/print.
243
11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006).
244
Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii).
245
See Norman L. Pernick & G. David Dean, Structured Chapter 11 Dismissals: A Viable and Growing Alternative After Asset Sales, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 56–58 (2010). For
a highly critical view of structured dismissals, see Nan Roberts Eitel, T. Patrick Tinker
& Lisa L. Lambert, Structured Dismissals, or Cases Dismissed Outside of Code’s Structure?,
30 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20 (2011).
246
Anthony Horvat, Defining the Role of the CRO, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 46. (2005).
247
See Ronit J. Berkovich et al., Prepackaged and Prenegotiated Chapter 11 Cases, in
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DISTRESSED DEBT, RESTRUCTURING & WORKOUTS 637,
637(PLI Comm. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 35267, 2012) .
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siderable difference in a case’s outcome. As with consumer bankruptcy, these differences are due to the use of nonbankruptcy law,
conflicting judicial precedent, and variances in court rules and pro248
cedures.
i.

Nonbankruptcy law

As noted, many sections of the Code require the court to apply
“nonbankruptcy law.” Section 510(a) provides that a pre-bankruptcy
subordination agreement is enforceable in bankruptcy “to the same
extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable
249
nonbankruptcy law.” This requires bankruptcy courts to apply state
250
law when considering such agreements. But state laws on subordination vary. For example, subordination agreements are readily en251
forceable under Illinois law, but face far more restrictions under
252
Michigan law.
In Ohio, a subordination agreement can be an informal “bargain of the parties as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or use
253
of trade or course of performance.”
The Ninth Circuit has held
that California law, which grants a purchase money deed of trust priority over all other liens, constitutes a subordination agreement with254
in the meaning of § 510(a). Similarly, a Kentucky court found that
a clause in a lease subordinating a tenant’s leasehold interest to a
bank’s mortgage qualified as a subordination agreement and was

248
The discussion that follows is by no means a complete treatment of all the differences in bankruptcy between state and federal jurisdictions. Subjects not treated
here include, among others, whether bankruptcy courts apply conflicts of law rules
based on federal common law or forum state law, rejection of collective bargaining
agreements under 11 U.S.C. § 1113, payment of retiree benefits under § 1114, and
whether a “free and clear” sale of assets under § 363(f) divests in personam claims.
249
11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2006).
250
In re Bank of New Eng. Corp., 646 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that
bankruptcy courts are to apply “general principles of state contract law when enforcing subordination agreements” and may not create “bankruptcy-specific rules of contract interpretation”).
251
In re Chi. S. Shore & S. Bend R.R., 146 B.R. 421, 425 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992)
(holding that subordination agreements are enforceable under Illinois state law).
252
In re Holly’s, Inc., 140 B.R. 643, 678–79 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (“Section
510(a) does not provide carte blanche to a creditor under the guise of a subordination agreement to collect a debtor’s postpetition earnings to be applied to prepetition debt.”); In re Cliff’s Ridge Skiing Corp., 123 B.R. 753, 765 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1991) (stating that the court will scrutinize whether subordination agreement is
based on sufficient consideration).
253
In re Envtl. Aspects, Inc., 235 B.R. 378, 396 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1999) (citing
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1301.01).
254
In re Sunset Bay Assocs., 944 F.2d 1503, 1508 (9th Cir. 1991).
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255

within the scope of § 510(a). In contrast, Pennsylvania law requires
256
a formal document with specific language executed by both parties.
State law under § 510(a) can even trump the powers of a trustee
under the Bankruptcy Code. The Second Circuit found that under
Vermont law, a trustee’s subrogation powers under § 544(a)(1) and §
551 do not extend to subordination agreements protected by §
257
510(a).
Even when not directly incorporated into the Code, state law
plays a role in bankruptcy. For example, “deepening insolvency” is a
tort of recent vintage whereby corporate officers, directors, and auditors can be subject to liability to creditors in a bankruptcy case for artificially attempting to prolong the life of an already insolvent com258
pany. To establish a cause of action, a plaintiff must prove that the
company was in the “zone of insolvency,” and that actions by the directors and officers to continue the enterprise breached a fiduciary
259
duty to creditors and the debtor itself. Whether liability exists under a given set of facts depends upon state laws governing fiduciary
260
duty, and some states do not even recognize the tort.

255
In re Buttermillk Towne Ctr., LLC, No. 10–21162, 2010 WL 5559411, at *3
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Dec. 30, 2010).
256
In re Dan-Ver Enters., Inc., 86 B.R. 443, 447 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (determining that written but unexecuted distribution agreements are not sufficient to constitute a valid subordination agreement).
257
In re Kors, Inc., 819 F.2d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that, under Vermont law, subordination agreements are enforceable only among creditors entitled
to priority who enter into such agreements).
258
Kyung S. Lee et al., Deepening Insolvency Doctrine: An Emerging Remedy
Against Contemporary Corporate Malfeasances 1 (Nov. 18–19, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author)(“The premise underlying deepening insolvency
theory is that even an insolvent company has value, which could be salvaged if the
company is liquidated or restructured in a timely manner.”).
259
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340,
347 (3d Cir. 2001) (defining the tort of deepening insolvency as “fraudulent expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life”); cf. Seitz v. Detweiler,
Hershey & Assoc., P.C. (In re CitX Corp., Inc.), 448 F.3d 672, 680 n.11 (3d Cir. 2006)
(suggesting that the Third Circuit should reconsider the case en banc).
260
See, e.g., Office Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of VarTec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re VarTec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 634–35 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2005). In that case, creditors accused VarTec’s lender of making improper
loans to the debtor and fraudulently inducing the debtor to pay down those loans
shortly before VarTec filed for bankruptcy. Id. The bankruptcy court dismissed the
case on motion of the lender for failure to state a claim, since it determined that
Texas courts would not recognize deepening insolvency as an independent cause of
action. Id. at 646; see also N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Fund, Inc. v.
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 94 (Del. 2007) (holding that directors and officers owed no
duties to creditors while corporation was in the “zone of insolvency”).
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ii. Case Precedent
a. Secured Creditor Right to Credit Bid
A foreclosure creditor under state law has the right to credit-bid
for its collateral at a foreclosure sale. This means that the creditor
does not have to offer actual money, but may simply bid the amount
261
of its lien.
This is because the creditor would be entitled to the
262
proceeds of the sale, up to the amount of its lien. Section 363(k) of
the Code preserves the right of a creditor to bid its lien in a sale of estate assets held during the pendency of a bankruptcy (before a reor263
ganization plan is filed) pursuant to § 363(b) of the Code.
A “363 sale” differs from a sale of assets conducted under the
terms of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan. If the debtor proposes to sell
assets as part of its plan of reorganization, and the creditor does not
consent to the sale, the debtor has three alternatives. First, the plan
can provide that the creditor’s lien will be retained until the present
264
value of the lien is paid in full. Second, the plan can provide “for
the sale, subject to 363(k) . . . of any property that is subject to the
265
liens.” Third, the plan can provide for the “realization by [the cred266
itor] of the indubitable equivalent” of its claim.
Given the express provision for the sale of assets set forth in option two, courts and practitioners have long assumed that a creditor
has the inherent right to credit bid in a sale of assets under a Chapter
267
11 plan. But this practice was recently rejected by the Third Circuit

261
See, e.g., In re Midway Invs., Ltd., 187 B.R. 382, 390–91 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995)
(“The right to credit bid the full amount of a secured claim is essential to the protection of a non-recourse secured creditor.”).
262
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 594–95 (1935)
(“[The secured lender has] the following property rights under the law of Kentucky:
. . . [t]he right to protect its interest in the property by bidding at such sale whenever
held, and thus to assure having the mortgaged property devoted primarily to the satisfaction of the debt, either through receipt of the proceeds of a fair competitive sale
or by taking the property itself.”).
263
Code section 363(k) provides in part, “At a sale under [this section] of property that is subject to a lien . . . if the holder of such claim purchases such property,
such holder may offset such claim against the purchase price of such property.” 11
U.S.C. § 363(k) (2006).
264
Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i).
265
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
266
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
267
See, e.g., Ralph Brubaker, Cramdown of an Undersecured Creditor Through Sale of the
Creditor’s Collateral: Herein of Indubitable Equivalence, the § 1111(b)(2) Election, Sub Rosa
Sales, Credit Bidding, and Disposition of Sale Proceeds, 29 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 12, Dec.
2009, at 1, 7–8.
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268

in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC. That case held that the debtor
could sell a secured asset under option three without allowing the
269
creditor the right to credit bid. The Fifth Circuit has also held that
270
a creditor has no absolute right to credit bid in a Chapter 11 sale.
271
This is a substantial change from past practice and favors debt272
ors and insiders at the expense of creditors. This shift particularly
affects creditors who are undersecured because credit bidding protects against sales at the bottom of the market. It also undermines
the strategy of “loan-to-own” investors who buy secured debt at discount prices with the intent to eventually credit bid to acquire the as273
sets if the debtor does not pay. Moreover, in an illiquid market with
debtors and creditors seeking scarce investment funds, the ability to
274
credit bid is a huge component of asset sales and restructuring.
As a Third Circuit Court of Appeals case, Philadelphia Newspapers
is binding on the Delaware bankruptcy court. Therefore, it is likely
to have a disproportionate effect on business bankruptcy. To date,
no courts outside the Third and Fifth Circuits have embraced the
275
rule. Debtors that have a choice of venue will weigh the advantages
of filing in a circuit that allows sales pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan
without credit bidding. Creditors will be stuck with the consequences.
b. Cram-Down Interest Rates
A Chapter 11 plan may be confirmed if it meets the requirements of § 1129(a)(1) to (16). Among these is the requirement that
all creditors whose claims are “impaired” (adversely affected) consent
268

599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 311.
270
Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pacific Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).
271
Michael H. Torkin & Douglas P. Bartner, Major Legal and Financial Factors Impacting Chapter 11 Restructuring in 2011, 2011 WL 586140, *4 (2011). As the authors
state, “Until very recently, the right to credit bid has been more or less taken for
granted.” Id.
272
See, e.g., In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 337 (3d Cir. 2010)
(Ambro, J., dissenting) (“Such a result would undermine the Bankruptcy Code by
skewing the incentives of the debtor to maximize benefits for insiders, not creditors.”).
273
Torkin & Bartner, supra note 271, at *4.
274
Id. at *3.
275
See, e.g., In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC, No. 09 B 30029, 2010 WL
6634603, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2010) (refusing to allow debtor to sell assets
under Chapter 11 plan without credit bidding and finding “Judge Ambro’s wellreasoned dissent in Philadelphia Newspapers more persuasive”).
269
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276

to the plan.
A plan can still be confirmed under § 1129(b) if all
other § 1129(a) conditions are met except for consent of all credi277
tors.
Confirmation of a plan under § 1129(b) (referred to as a
“cram-down”) allows the claims of secured and unsecured creditors to
278
be paid over time with interest. The rate of interest is a significant
component of the cost—and hence the feasibility—of a plan.
The Bankruptcy Code does not specify how the cram-down rate
of interest is to be determined, and courts have employed various
279
280
methods including the “formula rate,” “forced loan” rate, “pre281
282
In 2004, the
sumptive contract rate,” and “cost of funds rate.”
Supreme Court considered the matter of cram-down interest in Till v.
283
After examining the pros and cons of various apSCS Credit Corp.
284
proaches, the Court adopted the formula rate.
Under this approach, the bankruptcy court starts with the prime rate and then adds
285
a “plus” premium for the added risk of default by the debtor. The
Court declined to state what the amount of the risk factor should be

276

11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2006).
§ 1129(b)(1).
278
Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) provides that a holder of a secured claim receive
“deferred cash payments . . . of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least
the value of such holder’s interest.” For unsecured creditors, § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i)
provides that the creditor “receive or retain . . . property of a value, as of the effective
date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of the claim.” § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) .
“This ‘value’ is generally understood to be a market rate of interest, considering the
terms, quality of the security and any risk to be borne by the affected creditor.” In re
Linda Vista Cinemas, L.L.C., 442 B.R. 724, 748 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010).
279
The Second Circuit in In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir. 1997), adopted the
formula method. It was endorsed, but not formally adopted, by the Ninth Circuit in
In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 1990), and the Eighth Circuit in United States
v. Doud, 869 F.2d 1144, 1146 (8th Cir. 1989).
280
Under this approach, the court projects that the creditor has foreclosed the
loan and reinvested the proceeds in loans of equivalent duration and risk. The Seventh Circuit used this method in a Chapter 12 case. Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs.
of Mid-Am., ACA, 102 F.3d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 1996).
281
This approach is similar to the “forced loan” approach, except that the contract rate is presumed to be the market rate for the “coerced loan.” In re Till, 301
F.3d 583, 594 (7th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 541 U.S. 465 (2004). The rate could then be adjusted upward or downward if the creditor or debtor can show that the contract rate
is lower (or higher) than the market rate. Id. Other courts using this approach are
the Fifth Circuit, In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1997), and the Third
Circuit, GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 66–67 (3d Cir. 1993).
282
This is the rate that the creditor would have to pay to borrow funds equal to
the value of the collateral. In re Valenti, 105 F.3d at 64.
283
541 U.S. 465 (2004).
284
Id. at 471.
285
Id.
277
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but noted that many courts using this “formula rate” generally ap286
prove risk adjustments of one to three percent.
The Till “formula rate” rule might have been dispositive, even
with its ambiguous “plus” factors. The case was decided by a plurality
of four justices, however, and thus its precedential value is questiona287
ble. In contrast, four dissenting justices felt that the interest rate set
forth in the contract between the parties should be the presumptive
288
cram-down rate, while Justice Thomas, concurring only in the re289
sult, wrote that the interest rate should be zero. Furthermore, Till
dealt with a cram-down claim in Chapter 13. Although the Court asserted that it was “likely” that Congress intended the cram down in290
terest rate to be the same for Chapter 11 and 13, in a footnote the
Court suggested that cram-down interest rate in Chapter 11 was different from that in Chapter 13 because there is a market for Chapter
291
11 debtor financing. Thus, it is unclear whether the Court intend292
ed Till to apply to Chapter 11 cram-down interest. As a result, many
bankruptcy courts continue to apply pre-Till circuit court prece293
dent.
Since Till, courts have employed a variety of methods to calculate cram-down interest rates. These include the “efficient market
286

Id. at 480.
On the questionable precedential value of a plurality opinion, the Supreme
Court has stated that
an affirmance by an equally divided court is, as between the parties, a
conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but
the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority
for the determination of other cases either in [the Supreme Court] or
in inferior courts.
Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1910); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 737 (1983) (stating that reasoning not adopted by a majority of the court is not
binding precedent).
288
In re Till, 541 U.S. at 494.
289
Id. at 491.
290
Id. at 474.
291
Id. at 477 n.15.
292
See In re Prussia Assocs., 322 B.R. 572, 585, 589 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) (“Till is
instructive, but it is not controlling, insofar as mandating the use of the ‘formula’
approach . . . in every Chapter 11 case.”).
293
In re Cook, 322 B.R. 336, 345 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio. 2005) (“It is necessary to look
to Sixth Circuit case law for the proper rate of interest as no other Supreme Court
case addresses the issue, and the Till plurality does not overrule the binding precedent of the circuit.”); see also Combined Props./Greenbriar Ltd. P’ship v. Morrow, 58
F. Supp. 2d 675, 680–81 (E.D. Va. 1999) (finding that since a fragmented Supreme
Court decision was not entitled to precedential weight, Fourth Circuit case law on
point remained controlling).
287

AUSTIN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1120

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

6/17/2012 5:40 PM

[Vol. 42:1081

rate,” Till “formula rate,” the Till formula rate but only as a default,
the “presumptive contract” approach, and more recently, a “blended
rate” approach, when an actual market for the debt at issue does not
exist.
The “efficient market” rate draws on the dicta from Till that
there is a market for Chapter 11 debtor in possession (DIP) financing, and that therefore, the court can calculate the proper cram
down rate based on what rate a commercial lender would charge for
a loan to the debtor for a loan equal to the value of the secured debt
294
that is to be repaid under the Chapter 11 plan.
Using this approach, the court considers (usually based on the testimony of experts) what a standard market rate would be for a loan that is equal to
the amount of the creditor’s claim, assuming that the debtor had a
295
normal capital structure. This is the preferred method of calculating cram down interest rates for courts in the Third and Sixth Cir296
cuits.
The formula method, endorsed by the plurality in Till, requires
the court to start with a risk-free market rate, such as the prime rate
of a U.S. Treasury instrument with a maturity corresponding to the
debtor’s repayment schedule, and then add a risk premium based on
the risk of repayment under the plan. This is the favored approach
297
in the Tenth Circuit. Risk factors identified in Till include “the circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security, and the duration
298
and feasibility of the reorganization plan.”
Some courts will add
additional risk factors such as the debt service coverage ratio, loan to
299
value ratio, and the quality of any guarantors. While Till indicated
that the increase over the prime rate due to risk factors might be
from one to three percent, other courts have observed that this
amount may be unrealistically low and have allowed for higher

294

In re Am. HomePatient, Inc., 420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 569.
296
See In re Cantwell, 336 B.R. 688 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006); In re Seaspan Dev. Corp.
Nos. 04-21339, 04-21340, 2:05-CV-315, 2006 WL 2672298 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 18, 2006);
In re Prussia Assocs., 322 B.R. at 585.
297
In re Inv. Co. of the S.W., 341 B.R. 298, 326 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2006).
298
In re Till, 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004).
299
In re Griswold Bldg., LLC, 420 B.R. 666, 693 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2009); see In re
Deep River Warehouse, No. 04-52749, 2005 WL 2319201, at *11 (Bankr. M.D. N.C.
Sept. 22, 2005) (“Risk is increased significantly when the loan to value ratio is 100%,
but a high grade tenant positively affects that risk.”); In re Gramercy Twins Assocs.,
187 B.R. 112, 124 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he relatively high loan to value ratio
in this case, which is approximately 85%, increases the risk factor.”).
295
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300

amounts.
In short, even under the Supreme Court case of Till,
there is no uniform or set criteria for calculating cram-down interest
rates. Perhaps for this reason, many courts in the First, Fifth, Sixth
and Seventh Circuits use Till only if they determine that no applica301
ble market interest rate exists.
In seeking to establish a market rate, some courts use a “blended
rate” approach. This involves a more creative analysis to consider if
302
hypothetical cram-down financing for the debtor could exist.
Under this approach, the court attempts to determine if the debtor
could obtain a loan through a combination of different tranches of
financing. The interest rates of the tranches would then be blended
303
to determine an appropriate rate.
Thus, in In re 20 Bayard Views,
LLC, the debtor’s secured creditor proposed a three-tier hypothetical
structure including a $13.65-million loan secured by a first mortgage
at 7.5% interest, a $3.15-million mezzanine loan secured by a second
mortgage at 13.5% interest, and an equity investment of $3.63 million
304
based on a return rate of twenty-two percent.
This resulted in a
blended rate of 11.68%, compared to the debtor’s much lower pro305
posed rate of 3.9%.

300

See, e.g., In re Griswold Bldg., 420 B.R. at 696 (applying a five-percent risk adjustment); In re N.W. Timberline Enters., 348 B.R. 412, 434 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
301
See, e.g., In re 20 Bayard Views, LLC, 445 B.R. 83, 111 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(“Since there is no applicable market interest rate, it is appropriate to consider the
formula approach set forth in Till.”); In re Bryant, 439 B.R. 724, 741–42 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. 2010); Mercury Capital Corp. v. Millford Conn. Assocs., L.P., 354 B.R. 1, 11–13
(Bankr. D. Conn. 2006); In re N.W. Timberline Enters., Inc., 348 B.R. at 434; Bank of
Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. HomePatient, Inc.),
420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005); In re Greenwood Point, LP, 445 B.R. 885, 918
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2011) (“[W]here there is no efficient marketplace to establish the
rate of interest in a cramdown, the Court will use the current Prime Rate and add
basis points thereto to the extent that the loan is determined to be risky, and in a
number sufficient to compensate for the unusual risk.”).
302
“The blended rate approach . . . is not an attempt to mirror an actual market
that exists. Rather, it is an attempt by principled approach to create a proxy for a
market extrapolated from current data such that the court can reach the ultimate
question of ‘present value.’” In re N. Valley Mall, LLC, 432 B.R. 825, 835 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 2010).
303
See, e.g., Pac. First Bank v. Boulders on the River, Inc. (In re Boulders on the
River, Inc.), 164 B.R. 99, 103, 107 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the bankruptcy
court applied blended rate of nine percent); In re N. Valley Mall, LLC, 432 B.R. at
832–36 (applying blended rate of 8.5%); In re Cellular Info. Sys., 171 B.R. 926, 944
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying plan confirmation because cram down interest rate
was lower than the blended rate).
304
In re 20 Bayard Views, 445 B.R. 83.
305
Id. at 110, 112 (denying plan confirmation where debtor’s proposed cram
down rate was not an appropriate risk adjustment).
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Still another approach is the presumptive contract approach.
Under this approach, the interest rate is the contract rate between
306
The Sixth Cirthe parties under their pre-bankruptcy agreement.
cuit has ruled that the contract rate of interest must be used if the
307
debtor is solvent. Drawing on this authority, a Texas district court
held that the contract rate of fifteen percent was an appropriate
308
cram-down rate where the creditor is oversecured. This resulted in
an interest rate that was likely far higher than if the court had utilized
the Till “prime rate plus” formula. Other courts likewise have found
the contract rate to be appropriate, even where the debtor was insol309
vent.
The Nebraska Bankruptcy Court has promulgated a local bank310
ruptcy rule to govern interest rates in Chapter 11 cases.
This
Wichmann formula creates a presumption that the interest rate shall
be two percentage points higher than the national average of the
prime rate published in The Wall Street Journal on the day prior to the
311
confirmation hearing.
Courts have acknowledged the difficulty in obtaining certainty
and consistency in finding a market rate even where an efficient market may exist, and thus the last resort for establishing a rate may be
simply to employ the court’s equity power and whatever factors the
312
court may consider to be important in a particular instance.
c. Class Gifting and the Absolute Priority Rule
A recent development in bankruptcy is the practice of asset reallocation, commonly known as “gifting.” Gifting refers to the process
in which a secured creditor will contribute — “gift”—a portion of estate property that is fully encumbered by the creditor’s security to a
lower-priority class upon plan confirmation, bypassing the intermedi306

In re Del-A-Rae, Inc., 448 B.R. 303, 305 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011).
In re Dow Corning Corp., 456 F.3d 668, 679 (6th Cir. 2006).
308
Good v. RMR Inv., Inc., 428 B.R. 249, 256 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2010).
309
In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship, 116 F.3d 790, 800 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming
the rate set by the bankruptcy court).
310
NEB. R. BANKR. P. 3023-1.
311
NEB. R. BANKR. P. 3023-1(b). This formula approach was adopted following In
re Wichmann, 77 B.R. 718 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994), and was approved by the Supreme
Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). The rule also applies to interest
rates in Chapter 9, 12, and 13.
312
In re SJT Ventures, LLC, 441 B.R. 248, 255 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010) (“[A]n attempt to poll the local market for a consistent rate may yield unworkable results. . . .
A court of equity must seek out the approach that will most fairly and accurately account for the characteristics of the debtor and the market value of the creditor’s
claim.”).
307
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313

ate class of creditors. The secured creditor, it might agree to a gifting plan in order to resolve litigation which attacks its security interest. Many reorganization professionals view gifting as a powerful tool
in resolving litigation and achieving consensus among diverse inter314
ests in plan confirmation.
The Bankruptcy Code sets up priorities in the allocation and distribution of assets to creditors of the estate. As a general premise, se315
cured creditors have recourse to their collateral. Unsecured creditors receive a distribution of any unencumbered assets based on the
316
priority of their claim. Chapter 11 permits a bankruptcy debtor to
establish classes of creditors consistent with the Code’s priority
317
scheme. Claims within a class must be substantially similar to each
318
other, and many plans have a graduated order of senior and junior
319
claims, consistent with the claims priority scheme set forth in § 507.
Section 1129(b) of the Code lists the requirements to confirm a
320
plan of reorganization over the objection of creditors. Among the321
se is the “absolute priority rule” in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). The absolute priority rule provides that junior creditors may not receive any
property on account of their claims if the claims of any senior class
have not been paid in full (unless the senior class consents to less322
than-full payment).
Since equity interests are the lowest priority
323
claim in bankruptcy, this rule has traditionally been applied to prevent equity holders from retaining their interests if all other classes of
claims are not paid in full, unless the senior creditors have consented
324
to less-than-full payment.
A question arises whether gifting violates the absolute priority
rule because it allows junior creditors to receive a distribution for
their claims when the claims of an intermediate-creditor class have
313
Leah M. Eisenberg, Gifting and Asset Reallocation in Chapter 11 Proceedings: A Synthesized Approach, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 50, 54–55 (2010).
314
Id..
315
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2006).
316
Id. § 507.
317
Id. § 1122.
318
Id.
319
Id. § 507.
320
Id. § 1129(b).
321
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
322
§ 1129(b)(2)(B).
323
This is based on nonbankruptcy law, which historically provides that creditors
of a firm are entitled to be paid in full before the equity owners of a firm. CHARLES
JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 11.33 (2009).
324
Id.
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not been paid in full—even though the distribution comes from a
class senior to the intermediate class and even though the distribution to the intermediate class is not changed as a result of the gifting.
The answer depends on how strictly the court applies the absolute
priority rule.
The Third Circuit in In re Armstrong World Industries refused to
confirm a plan under which one class of unsecured creditors would
grant part of its distribution in the form of stock warrants to the equity class while a second class of unsecured creditors had not been paid
325
in full. Such a plan, the court held, would “read the § 1129(b) re326
quirements out of the Code.” The Second Circuit likewise rejected
plans with gifting provisions in In re DBSD North America, where the
court reversed the district court’s ruling which allowed a plan that
proposed to give unsecured creditors shares in the reorganized company (worth no more than forty-six percent of their claims) while at
the same time providing shares and warrants to the lower priority eq327
uity class. The court found this to be a “fatal” violation of the absolute priority rule, which does not permit a junior class to receive any
property on account of its interest if a class with higher priority is not
328
paid in full.
Even after the ruling in In re Armstrong, however, bankruptcy
courts in the District of Delaware, which is in the Third Circuit, have
approved gifting plans if the gift comes solely from the collateral of a
329
330
secured lender or from a third party. Such decisions suggest that
judges in this court will construe In re Armstrong as narrowly as possible. These types of plans would not be permissible in the First Cir331
cuit.
325

320 B.R. 523, 525–26 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005), aff’d, 432 F.3d 50 (3d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 540 (citing In re Sentry Operating Co. of Tex., 264 B.R. 850, 865 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2001)).
327
634 F.3d 79, 108 (2d Cir. 2011).
328
Id. at 97–98.
329
See, e.g., In re Wash. Mutual, Inc., 442 B.R. 314 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011); In re
World Health Alternatives, Inc., 344 B.R. 291 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (approving carveout of secured creditor’s collateral as fund for unsecured creditors to investigate and
pursuit of claims against other parties).
330
In re TSIC, Inc., 393 B.R. 71 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (stalking horse bidder
providing value to unsecured creditors in exchange for agreement to not object to
withdrawal of a bid).
331
For example, in In re CGE Shattuck, LLC, 254 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000), the
bankruptcy court denied confirmation of a plan where there was a separate agreement (not in the plan) between secured lender and unsecured lenders, finding that
“[t]he economic substance and effect of the [gifting] would be to sanction a distribution scheme that discriminates between creditors in the same class.” Id. at 19.
326
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The response to gifting plans by courts in other circuits has been
mixed. Courts in the First Circuit are consistently favorable to gifting
332
333
334
plans, while courts in Texas and Ohio have ruled both ways.
Results from other bankruptcy courts are likewise mixed, with courts
335
336
in Missouri and California approving gifting, while courts in Loui337
338
siana and Virginia rejecting them.
As these cases show, whether
gifting will be permitted in a Chapter 11 case depends on the forum
in which the case is filed.
d. Enforcement of Pre-Petition Intercreditor Agreements
Pre-bankruptcy intercreditor agreements are agreements between junior and senior lenders when the debtor incurs multiple tiers
of debt. Such agreements provide for subordination of one creditor’s
332
Official, Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Stern (In re SPM Mfg. Corp.), 984
F.2d 1305, 1313 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that secured creditor in Chapter 7 case is
permitted to share sale proceeds with unsecured creditors while IRS priority unsecured claim was unpaid on the grounds that sale proceeds belonged to secured creditor).
333
Compare In re MCorp. Fin., Inc., 160 B.R. 941 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (affirming a plan
under which senior bondholder gifted a portion of its claim to fund settlement between debtor and FDIC over junior bondholders), and In re IDEARC, Inc., 423 B.R.
138 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009) (noting that a gift from lender’s collateral to general
unsecured creditors over unsecured note holders was only minor discrimination between classes), with In re Sentry Operating Co. of Tex., 264 B.R. 850 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2001) (rejecting a plan which provided for gift of 100% recovery to trade creditors
but only one percent recovery to non-trade creditors because trade creditors were
not essential to reorganization).
334
Compare In re Schwab Indus., Inc., No. 10-60702-rk, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 5970
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2010) (affirming a plan under which there was a gift
from prepetition lenders to unsecured creditors of $850,000 plus fifteen percent of
net sale proceeds), with In re Synders Drug Stores, Inc., 307 B.R. 889 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2004) (disallowing debtor’s gift of proceeds of avoidance actions to unsecured
trade creditors over unsecured non-trade creditors because avoidance proceeds are
property of the estate for all creditors and because debtor failed to prove critical
vendor status for favored class).
335
In re Union Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 303 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2003) (approving a gift from secured lender’s collateral to unsecured trade creditors over unsecured non-trade creditors where the favored class was necessary to the reorganization).
336
In re Fanita Ranch, L.P., No. 10-05750-MM11, 2010 WL 4955892 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. Nov. 5, 2010) (approving a gift of bankruptcy dividends from secured lender to
certain unsecured creditors and to the exclusion of other unsecured creditors).
337
In re OCA, Inc., 357 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006) (disallowing a gift of right
to a percentage of new common stock from secured lender to equity holders after
objections of general unsecured creditors).
338
In re On-Site Sourcing, Inc., 412 B.R. 817 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009) (denying DIP
lender’s gift to general unsecured creditors pursuant to § 363 asset sale after the objections of priority creditors as an attempt to evade Chapter 11 plan confirmation
process).
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security interest to the other creditor, and are presumed to be en339
forceable under § 510(a) of the Code.
But these agreements can
also include “stay-silent” or “no-contest” provisions whereby the junior or subordinated creditor agrees not to challenge the senior creditor’s priority of its interest in collateral, promises to vote in favor of a
bankruptcy plan approved by the secured lender, to waive rights to
enforce subordinated obligations, or to waive rights to a post-petition
340
financing DIP agreement.
These are common elements of multitier financing, but they are inconsistent with the rights granted to the
parties under the Bankruptcy Code. Are such terms enforceable under § 510(a)? Courts are split.
One of the first cases to address this issue was In re Hart Ski Manufacturing Co., in which a Minnesota bankruptcy court refused to enforce an intercreditor agreement that, the senior creditor alleged,
prohibited the junior creditor from seeking adequate protection or
341
termination of the automatic stay. Finding such terms to be at odds
with the rights granted under the Bankruptcy Code, the court stated
that “[t]here is no indication that Congress intended to allow creditors to alter, by a subordination agreement, the bankruptcy laws un342
related to distribution of assets.”
More recently in In re Ion Media Networks, the debtor issued $850
million of first-lien debt in addition to second-lien debt, both secured
by substantially all assets of the company, which the court valued be343
tween $310 and $445 million. An intercreditor agreement set forth
the priorities of the parties to the collateral and provided that
344
After
nonperfection of any lien would not affect those priorities.
the bankruptcy was filed, the junior lien creditors sought to challenge
whether the senior lender’s liens over certain FCC licenses had been
345
duly perfected. The court refused to allow the challenge, holding
that it would “not disturb the bargained-for rights . . . governing the
346
second lien debt.”

339

11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2006).
See Mark N. Berman & Jo Ann Brighton, An Update on Second-Lien Financings
and Intercreditor Agreements: Part I, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 40–41, 95–96 (2011).
341
5 B.R. 734, 735 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
342
Id.
343
419 B.R. 585, 592 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
344
Id. at 594.
345
Id. at 593–94.
346
Id. at 595.
340
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In contrast, the court in In re TCI 2 Holdings, LLC ruled the op347
posite.
In that case, there was a $488 million first lien debt and
348
The intercreditor agreement
$1.25 billion in second lien notes.
provided that the second lien creditor could not receive any pay349
ments until the first lien was paid in full. After the bankruptcy was
350
filed, both creditors submitted competing plans of reorganization.
The second lien creditor’s plan, which was supported by the debtor,
provided for distributions and subscription rights in favor of the second creditor equal to seventy percent of the reorganized debtor,
while the first lien creditor would receive partial payment of its debt
351
in cash and a note for the remainder.
The senior lienholder objected to the plan on the basis that it breached the intercreditor
352
agreement. The court confirmed the plan notwithstanding the objection, finding that all the requirements for plan confirmation un353
der § 1129(a) and (b) of the Code were satisfied.
Results in other courts are likewise mixed. A Texas court denied
a motion by subordinated creditors to appoint a bankruptcy examin354
er where the intercreditor agreement prohibited such action.
Although the Code clearly allows for such appointment, the court determined that “[i]t is well-settled that rights under statute may be
355
contractually waived.” An Illinois court reached the exact opposite
conclusion in declining to uphold a provision in an intercreditor
agreement pursuant to which the subordinated creditor assigned its
356
right to vote in plan confirmation to the senior creditor. The court
held that “[i]t is generally understood that prebankruptcy agree357
ments do not override contrary provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”
Other courts limit intercreditor agreements to enforcement of pay-

347

428 B.R. 117 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010).
Id. at 129.
349
Id. at 138.
350
Id. at 128.
351
Id. at 130–31.
352
Id. at 139.
353
In re TCI 2 Holdings, 428 B.R. at 140–41.
354
In re Erickson Ret. Cmtys., 425 B.R. 309 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010).
355
Id. at 316.
356
Bank of Am., Nat’l Ass’n. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship (In re 203 N. LaSalle St.
P’ship), 246 B.R. 325 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000).
357
Id. at 331; see also In re SW Bos. Hotel Venture, LLC, 460 B.R. 38, 51 (Bankr.
Mass. 2011) (holding that junior lender’s pre-petition assignment of bankruptcy plan
voting rights to senior lender was not enforceable).
348
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358

ment priorities only, while some uphold other provisions, such as
assignment of the junior creditor’s voting rights to the senior credi359
tor, or waiver of rights by a lienholder to adequate protection of
360
collateral.
e. Assumption of Executory Contracts and Unexpired
Leases
Section 365(a) of the Code permits a debtor to assume or reject
361
an “executory contract or unexpired lease.”
Once the debtor has
assumed the contract or lease, the debtor may then “assign” (transfer
or sell) the contract or lease to a third party, even if the contract itself
362
prohibits such assignment without consent of each party. The power to assume or reject a contract or lease can be of great benefit to
the debtor by allowing it to get rid of unprofitable obligations, continue beneficial ones, and even sell a lease or contract that may not
be beneficial to it, but that nevertheless has market value and can be
sold for cash.
The authority to assign a contract or lease is qualified by §
365(c)(1), which provides that the debtor “may not assume or assign”
the contract or lease if “applicable [nonbankruptcy] law excuses a
party . . . from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor . . .” and the non-debtor
363
“party does not consent to the assumption or assignment.”
This
provision recognizes traditional state law doctrine that contracts such
as personal-services contracts cannot be assigned without the non364
assignor’s permission, as well as federal law, which prohibits the as365
signment of non-exclusive intellectual property rights and govern366
ment contracts.
358

In re Ocean Blue Leasehold Prop., LLC, 414 B.R. 798, 804 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2009).
359
In re Aerosol Packaging, LLC, 362 B.R. 43, 46 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006); In re
Curtis Ctr. Ltd. P’ship, 192 B.R. 648, 660 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
360
Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. v. Tousa, Inc., Nos. 08-61317-CIV, 08-61335, 2009
WL 6453077, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2009); In re Metaldyne Corp., No. 09-13412 MG,
2009 WL 2883045, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2009).
361
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006). If a contract or lease is not assumed, then by operation of statute it becomes automatically rejected (terminated) and is no longer of any
force or effect.
362
§ 365(f).
363
§ 365(c)(1)(a), (b).
364
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (1981).
365
See, e.g., In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 242–43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1997).
366
41 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
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Yet § 365(c)(1) appears to address more than just the assignment
of contract rights. If read strictly, the statute bars the debtor from
even assuming the contract if forum-state law allows the non-debtor
party to refuse to accept the contract or render performance. For
example, an exclusive software or patent (IP) license is freely transferable and so can be assumed or assigned by the debtor in bank367
ruptcy whether or not the licensor consents.
However, a nonexclusive IP license is not assignable over the objection of the licensor, and thus could not be assumed by a debtor even if the debtor has
368
no intention of assigning the license. This can be a major issue in a
bankruptcy case where the debtor has significant IP licenses.
While a restriction on the assignment of certain contracts is logical, extending the prohibition to allow the non-debtor party to veto
the debtor’s assumption of a contract is not. Without the right to assume such contracts, “some debtors-in-possession may be unable to
effect the successful reorganization that Chapter 11 was designed to
369
promote.” Additionally, the restriction could give a windfall to the
nondebtor, who does not have the right to renege on its agreement
370
“[B]ut if the debtor seeks bankruptcy prooutside of bankruptcy.
tection, then the nondebtor obtains the power to reclaim—and resell
at the prevailing, potentially higher market rate—the rights it sold to
371
the debtor.”
It is not surprising that courts are split over the effect of §
365(c). The main fault line is between the “hypothetical test” and the
“actual test.” Courts adopting the hypothetical test read the statute
literally to prohibit even the assumption of a contract when the other
party would be excused from performance if the contract was as372
373
374
signed.
Courts adopting this test include the Third, Fourth,
375
376
377
Ninth, and Eleventh circuits, and an Illinois district court.

367

In re Gold Books Family Entm’t, Inc., 269 B.R. 311, 314 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001).
Id. at 316.
369
N.C.P. Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577, 1577 (2009)
(denying petition for certiorari).
370
Id.
371
Id.
372
In re Jackson, 465 B.R. 102, 105 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2011) (declining to apply
the hypothetical test).
373
In re West Elecs., Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]f non-bankruptcy law
provides that the [non-debtor party] would have to consent to an assignment of the .
. . contract to a third party . . . then . . . the debtor in possession, cannot assume that
contract.”); Allentown Ambassadors, Inc. v. N. E. Am. Baseball, LLC (In re Allentown
Ambassadors, Inc.), 361 B.R. 422 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007).
368
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In contrast, other courts use the “actual test,” holding that §
365(c) should instead be read to prohibit assumption only if the
378
debtor intends to assign the contract to a third party. The First and
379
Fifth Circuits have adopted this test, as have lower courts in the Se380
381
382
383
cond, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth circuits. The Supreme Court
has taken notice of the split in authority, but has not addressed the
384
issue.
f. Critical Vendors
A core premise of bankruptcy is that all non-priority general unsecured creditors are treated equally, which means that they each receive the same pro rata share of any distribution from the bankruptcy
385
estate. Over the years, however, a doctrine has emerged known as
the “doctrine of necessity” or, alternatively, the “critical vendor rule.”
This rule allows a debtor to pay prepetition claims to vendors whose
goods or services are deemed essential to the continued operation of
the debtor if the vendor would refuse to provide the services or goods

374
RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257 (4th
Cir. 2004); Breeden v. Catron (In re Catron), 158 B.R. 629 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff’d without opinion, 25 F.3d 1038 (4th Cir. 1994).
375
Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747
(9th Cir. 1999).
376
City of Jamestown v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable Partners), 27
F.3d 534 (11th Cir. 1994); Wellington Vision, Inc. v. Pearle Vision, Inc. (In re Wellington Vision, Inc.), 364 B.R. 129 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
377
In re Morgan Sangamon P’ship, 269 B.R. 652 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001).
378
Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 613 (1st Cir. 1995)
(“[W]here a debtor . . . bears the burden of performance under an executory contract, the nondebtor party to whom performance is due must make an individualized
showing that it would not receive the ‘full benefit of [its] bargain’ were an entity to
be substituted for the debtor from whom performance is due.”)
379
Bonneville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp. (In re Mirant Corp.), 440 F.3d 238,
248 (5th Cir. 2006); In re Jacobsen, 465 B.R. 102, 106 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2011).
380
In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a trustee
cannot assume or assign, but a DIP can assume without assigning where contract is
non-assignable under applicable law).
381
In re Ohio Skill Games, Inc., No. 08-60560, 2010 WL 2710522, at *7 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio July 8, 2010).
382
In re GP Express Airlines, Inc., 200 B.R. 222, 232 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996).
383
C.O.P. Coal Dev. Co. v. C.W. Mining Co. (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 422 B.R. 746
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2010); In re Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, 373 B.R. 135
(Bankr. D.N.M. 2007).
384
N.C.P. Mktg. Grp. V. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577, 1578 (2009) (“[T]he
division in the courts over the meaning of § 365(c)(1) is an important one to resolve
. . . .”).
385
TABB, supra note 323, § 1.23.
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386

without the payment.
This obviously violates the equal treatment
principal and reduces the funds available for non-favored creditors.
A number of courts have authorized payments to critical vendors
based upon the equitable powers granted to a bankruptcy court un387
der § 105(a) or other sections of the Code.
While there are no
opinions from the First or Second Circuit, lower courts in these juris388
dictions generally grant critical vendor motions, as do courts in the
389
390
391
Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have allowed critical vendor payments, but only under very strict
392
The Third Circuit has questioned whether § 105(b) percriteria.
393
mits the court to elevate critical vendor claims, but bankruptcy
394
courts in that circuit routinely allow such payments. Rulings in the
395
Fourth and Fifth Circuits are mixed, but the Seventh Circuit is firm396
ly against this rule.
386

Id. § 11.12.
Id. Section 105(a) of the Code provides that “[t]he court may issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
this title.” 11 U.S.C. §105(a) (2006). Other courts have relied on other sections of
the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 497 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2002) (relying on § 1107); In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543, 547
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001) (relying on § 364); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174,
176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (relying on § 363(b)).
388
J.M. Blanco, Inc. v. PMC Mktg. Corp., No. 09-1781(GAG), 2009 WL 5184458, at
*5–6 (D.P.R. Dec. 22, 2009). But see In re Zenus Is Jewelry, Inc., 378 B.R. 432, 433
(Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (stating that the doctrine of necessity restricted to railroads
and is not applicable to critical vendors).
389
In re Corner Home Care, Inc., 438 B.R. 122, 127–29 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2010); In
re Quality Interiors, Inc., 127 B.R. 391, 396–97 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991).
390
In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001); In re
Wehrenberg, Inc., 260 B.R. 468 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2001).
391
In re Rancher Energy Corp., No. 09-32943-MER, 2010 WL 6570895 (Bankr. D.
Colo. Nov. 16, 2010).
392
In re Tropical Sportswear Int’l Corp., 320 B.R. 15, 20 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005)
(granting critical vendor payments pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 only in “appropriate circumstances”); In re Fultonville Metal Prods. Co., 330 B.R. 305, 313
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (“[R]equests [for critical vendor payments] should be carefully scrutinized, and only granted when the circumstances establish that the selected
payments are necessary to the reorganization case and will ultimately benefit all of
the creditors of the estate.”).
393
See S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 141–42 (3d Cir. 1985).
394
In re Motor Coach Indus. Int’l., Inc., No. 09-078-SLR, 2009 WL 330993, at *3
(D. Del. Feb. 10, 2009); In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 171 B.R. 189, 192 (Bankr. D.
Del.1994).
395
Within the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction, compare Official Comm. of Equity
Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that § 105 does not
grant power to deviate from the statutory distribution scheme), with In re United Am.
Inc., 327 B.R. 776, 781–84 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) (setting forth three-prong test for
the doctrine of necessity), and In re Synteen Techs., Inc., No. 00-02203-W, 2000 WL
387
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iii. Bankruptcy Trustees and Local Practice Differences
a. Bankruptcy Trustees
A bankruptcy case requires both adjudicative and administrative
action. In order to enhance the perception of impartiality in decision-making, many of the administrative functions of bankruptcy are
397
delegated to the Office of the UST. Their duties in Chapter 11 include convening the meeting of creditors, and reviewing and monitoring debtors and creditors (and their counsel.Since 1986, the six
federal districts in Alabama and North Carolina have been exempt
398
from the UST Program.
Bankruptcy administration in those districts is performed under the Bankruptcy Administrator Program by
399
the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts.
There are a number of
differences between a UST and a Bankruptcy Administrator. For example, the Code directs that a UST appoints interim Chapter 7 trus400
401
tees, Chapter 13 trustees, and committee members in Chapter 11
402
cases. Bankruptcy Administrators have no such powers. Additionally, they are appointed and governed by the circuit court and are subject to rules promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United
403
States.
Furthermore, unlike the UST program, the Bankruptcy
33709667, at *2 (Bankr. D.S.C. Apr. 14, 2000) (finding that § 105(a) allows payment
of pre-petition creditor claims “when essential to the continued operation of the
debtor”).
Within the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction, compare In re Oxford Mgmt., Inc., 4 F.3d
1329, 1333–34 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding no authority under § 105(a) to use postpetition funds to pay pre-petition claims), with In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 497
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (finding that the doctrine of necessity is permissible pursuant to the trustee’s duty under § 1107 to preserve on-going concern value).
396
In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that § 105(a)
does not allow for unequal payments to any unsecured creditors).
397
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 89–91 (1977); see also Richard B. Levin & Kenneth N.
Klee, The Original Intent of the United States Trustee System, 1 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISOR,
Jan. 1993, at 2–3.
398
See Dan J. Schulman, The Constitution, Interest Groups, and the Requirements of Uniformity: The United States Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator Programs, 74 NEB. L.
REV. 91, 94–98 (1995).
399
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–554, 100 Stat. 3088 (2006).
400
11 U.S.C. § 701 (2006).
401
Id. § 1302.
402
Id. § 1102.
403
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 601, 604 (2006). For a 1997 study by the National Bankruptcy Review Commission comparing the U.S. Trustee Program with the Bankruptcy Administrator Program, see Memorandum from Lawrence P. King, Prof. of Law,
N.Y.U. Univ. Sch. of Law and Elizabeth I. Holland, to the Nat’l Bankr. Review
Comm’n
(Aug.
6,
1997),
available
at
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Administrator program is not self-funding; instead, it uses fees ap404
propriated to the judicial branch. At least one circuit has found the
Bankruptcy Administrator program to be unconstitutional for lack of
405
406
uniformity, but no other court has agreed.
The same 1986 statute that allowed the federal districts in Alabama and North Carolina to opt out of the UST program also included a number of amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules in order to
further implement the UST program. For example, Bankruptcy Rule
9035 provides that the 1986 rule amendments do not apply to cases
407
filed in or transferred to those districts. Such rules include rules for
transmission of documents and notices, UST reporting and monitoring requirements, and more importantly, the UST’s powers to appoint and oversee Chapter 7 and 13 trustees, and Chapter 11 com408
mittees. In districts where the bankruptcy administrator program is
in place, the bankruptcy court performs the appointment and over409
sight functions.
b. Local Practice Differences
The differences in styles and attitudes of bankruptcy judges can
influence where business debtors file their cases. Professor Lynn
410
LoPucki has identified a number of these inherent differences. For
example, LoPucki asserts that when the 1978 Bankruptcy Code went
into effect, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York drew a disproportionate number of large Chapter 11 cases primarily because of the “pro-debtor” and “pro-reorganization” values of
411
Judge Burton R. Lifland.
Beginning in 1990, however, that momentum shifted to the District of Delaware bankruptcy court largely
412
because of the attitudes of a particular judge, Judge Helen Balick.

http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/Cont
entDisplay.cfm&ContentID=36526.
404
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-113, BANKRUPTCY
ADMINISTRATION: JUSTIFICATION LACKING FOR CONTINUING TWO PARALLEL PROGRAMS 1
(1992).
405
St. Angelo v. Victoria Farms, Inc., 38 F.3d 1525 (9th Cir. 1994).
406
See, e.g., In re Swinney, 300 B.R. 388 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003), aff’d, 309 B.R. 638
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2004).
407
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9035.
408
FED R. BANKR. P. 9035 advisory committee’s note.
409
Id.
410
LYNN LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005).
411
Id. at 45–47.
412
Id. at 72–75.
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This may reflect Delaware’s focused policy of being a corporate ha413
ven. Bankruptcy judges’ policies in Delaware, therefore, would be
intended to preserve and enhance Delaware’s status as a dominant
414
forum for incorporation.
Specifically, Judge Balick ruled that a
corporation’s venue for bankruptcy purposes could be its state of incorporation, thereby allowing any corporation incorporated in Dela415
ware to file bankruptcy in the Delaware bankruptcy court.
More
fundamentally, Judge Balick adopted procedural innovations such as
416
the “first-day motion.” These are motions made by the debtor contemporaneously with the filing of a case to grant such key authorizations as authority to employ counsel and other professionals, use collateral (for example, money in bank accounts subject to a creditor’s
417
security interest), pay employees, and pay “critical vendors.” These
pro-debtor policies gave immediate results. By 1996, thirteen of the
fifteen largest corporate bankruptcies that year were filed in Dela418
ware. But it appears that major case filings are again shifting back
to the Southern District of New York, perhaps due to a perception of
419
“cronyism” between management and judges in that district.
While the rise of Delaware and the Southern District of New
York as prime bankruptcy forums is not disputed, the reasons for it
are debated. Kenneth Ayotte and David A. Skeel argue that Delaware’s attraction as a corporate bankruptcy forum is due to superior
judicial expertise, speed, and efficiency of the Delaware bankruptcy
420
courts.
Factors cited include fewer extensions of creditor voting
deadlines thereby allowing less distortion and influence by credi421
422
tors, greater judicial experience with large, complex cases, and
greater allowance for DIP financial control over entrenched man423
agement.
413

Id. at 8.
Todd J. Zwicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94
GEO. L.J. 1141, 1160 (2006).
415
In re Ocean Props. of Del., Inc., 95 B.R. 304, 305 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988).
416
LOPUCKI, supra note 410, at 38.
417
Id.
418
Id. at 50.
419
William McGrane, A Creditor Strategy to Pre-Empt S.D.N.Y. Venue, 30-5 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 46, 46–47 (2011).
420
Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 454 (2006); see also David A. Skeel, Jr.,
What’s So Bad About Delaware?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 309, 325–26 (2001).
421
Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 420, at 457–58.
422
Id. at 461.
423
Id. at 463–64.
414
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Differences in judicial attitudes may also affect the treatment of
creditors. One commentator asserts that unsecured creditors will get
better results if they force debtors into involuntary bankruptcy in
courts outside of large cities, where case precedent and judicial atti424
tudes are less favorable to large-scale debtors. This may explain the
relatively harsh punishment meted out to a former star Wall Street
lawyer who was convicted of fraud and sentenced to prison in a Wisconsin bankruptcy court for practices that would have garnered no
425
more than a civil fine in the Southern District of New York.
III. UNIFORMITY AS POLICY AND AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
A. Uniformity as Sound Policy
Lack of uniformity in national bankruptcy law is bad policy.
Drawing on Madison’s belief that commerce and bankruptcy are in426
extricably linked, creating essentially ninety-four different bankruptcy regimes is like creating ninety-four different commerce regimes. There are sound reasons why bankruptcy law in the United
States should be uniform.
1. Efficiency in Contractual Relations
The purpose of contract law is to shape the expectations of par427
ties in structuring their economic relations. The underlying regime
of contract expectations outside the four corners of a contract allows
parties to economically engage in transactions because they do not
have to re-formulate basic expectations for every new transaction.
While contract law in the United States is governed primarily by state
law, it is highly uniform because of the enactment, with few variations, of the Uniform Commercial Code in every state. To the extent
that there are substantive differences in contract law among states,
parties can anticipate and adjust for this by including choice-of-forum
428
clauses or choice-of-law clauses.
A transparent and uniform contract law makes transactions more efficient and economical.
424

McGrane, supra note 419, at 47.
Ronald R. Peterson, Criminal Liability for the Bankruptcy Practitioner, in ATTORNEY
LIABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY 316–17 (Corrine Cooper & Catherine E. Vance eds., 2006).
Other studies have noted variations in regional practice due to local legal culture.
See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE
OF THE BAR (1982); MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION (1988).
426
See infra notes 552–54 and accompanying text.
427
1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (rev. ed. 2002).
428
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(f) (1971).
425
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Bankruptcy also shapes the expectations of parties. Whereas
contract law anticipates positive economic relations between parties,
bankruptcy law is a mechanism whereby those relations can be dis429
solved or modified. Bankruptcy is a legal manifestation of the risk
component inherent in a modern economic relationship. Since parties know at the outset of their contractual relations that a future
bankruptcy by a party is possible, bankruptcy law forms part of the
framework within which parties formulate their contractual interests.
It also provides a framework for debt negotiation and resolution out430
side of bankruptcy.
While contract and bankruptcy law are both regimes that shape
the economic expectations of parties, there is an ineluctable difference between contract and bankruptcy law. In bankruptcy law, unlike contract law, there is no “choice of bankruptcy law” option. Parties, anticipating that their future economic relationship might devolve into bankruptcy, cannot at the outset of their relations prescribe which bankruptcy law will apply. In the United States there is
only one national bankruptcy law—the Code. Parties do not have the
choice of opting out of the Code, selecting an alternative bankruptcy
law, or even specifying which federal court precedent will govern interpretation of the Code. The types of choice-of-law options that are
common in contract law are not available to parties with respect to
bankruptcy.
Just as bankruptcy does not allow parties to contract for choice
of bankruptcy law, it also does not allow the parties to specify by contract which venues may or may not be permissible. For a business
debtor, bankruptcy venue is proper where the debtor’s domicile,
431
principal place of business, or principal assets are located, or where
432
there is a pending Chapter 11 case filed by an affiliate. For a business that has assets, offices, or subsidiaries in different locations, this
can result in a range of potential venues for filing bankruptcy. As has
been shown, the location of a bankruptcy case may well be dispositive
of the rights of the parties. But parties cannot specify by contract
prior to a bankruptcy which bankruptcy venues are allowable and

429

United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990) (“[B]ankruptcy
courts . . . have broad authority to modify debtor-creditor relationships.”).
430
See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditor’s
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 867 (1982).
431
28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (2006).
432
Id. § 1408(2).
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433

which ones are not. This lack of a choice of venue for bankruptcy
takes away bargaining power from the non-debtor party because the
debtor can strategically select the bankruptcy forum that is most favorable to it. This undermines the transparency that contracts provide.
The logic of bankruptcy uniformity, therefore, is the same as the
logic of contract uniformity: both facilitate transparency and predictability in financial relations. Uniformity increases the information
equality of the parties and allows them to negotiate, account for risk,
and contract efficiently. Because bankruptcy venue can be such a
large factor in determining bankruptcy outcomes, the efficiencies
that would be gained from a unified bankruptcy regime are lost. This
result is not optimal and supports bankruptcy uniformity.
2.

Judicial Efficiency

American law has long recognized the efficiency of a uniform
federal court system. Prior to 1938, pleadings and practice in federal
courts were required to conform to those of the state in which the
434
federal court was located. This made it difficult for courts to apply
federal law. Additionally, clients had to obtain separate counsel in
each state, and appellate courts had to accommodate multiple pro435
cedural regimes arising under state law.
To address these prob436
lems, the Supreme Court, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, issued the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to govern the
administration of federal courts. There are clear efficiencies to this
437
uniformity.
The efficiencies resulting from uniformity in federal courts apply
with greater force in bankruptcy. The Code was created to be administered by a singular judicial system—the bankruptcy courts—unlike
most other federal statutes that are primarily administered by federal
agencies. The bankruptcy court system, in turn, exists to administer a
433

In re Charys Holding Co., 443 B.R. 628, 634 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (holding
that forum selection clauses should not be enforced in core bankruptcy matters); cf.
Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that courtapproved forum-selection agreement between creditor and debtor prior to the bankruptcy restricted where the debtor could file for bankruptcy).
434
Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197, superseded by Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006).
435
Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, Individual Judges’ Practices: An Inadvertent Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 4 (1994).
436
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
437
Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46
MERCER L. REV. 757, 780–83 (1995).
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single statute, the Bankruptcy Code, and in accordance with a single
set of procedural rules, the Federal Bankruptcy Rules. And while
bankruptcy judges sit in every federal district and serve debtors in
every state, the bankruptcy courts are not intended or equipped to be
the interpreters of multiple sets of laws. In this, they differ from the
state courts (which deal with a broad range of laws in their forum
state) and from federal district courts (which have jurisdiction over
actions arising from many federal statutes and regulations). The efficiency of a bankruptcy court is that it is dedicated to adjudicating only cases arising under the Bankruptcy Code. This efficiency is lost to
the extent that parties, attorneys, and bankruptcy courts must process
multiple and conflicting precedents, state-specific laws, and myriad
systems of local rules and procedures.
The lack of unified bankruptcy law also makes it more difficult
for lawyers to practice. They must learn different local rules and orders, and become knowledgeable about state laws and federal precedent in the jurisdictions that will affect the case. This increases costs
for clients and makes it more difficult for lawyers to practice nationally. As a result, it shields local practitioners from the full effects of
competition. In practice, the current bankruptcy regime functions
less like a single court system and more like ninety-four separate
ones. As such, the potential efficiencies of a unified court system are
lost.
3. Fairness
The definition of “fairness” is elusive in the law, but it in part requires that courts treat similar situations in similar ways. When courts
treat two similar cases differently, it gives the appearance at least one
438
unfair decision being produced. Thus, it is inherently unfair if the
outcome of a bankruptcy case is based upon the accident of location
439
when the facts of a case are otherwise similar. Uniform treatment
of parties under the law, regardless of location, mitigates the percep440
tion that the law is irrational and unfair.
Such equality is “a hall438
Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 652–53 (2001).
439
Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 437, at 782.
440
Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 39 n.146 (1994) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (“[S]elective application of new rules violates the principle
of treating similarly situated defendants the same.”)); Sandra D. O’Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985) (“[A] single sovereign’s laws
should be applied equally to all . . . .”); Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent
and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 244 (1987) (“[T]he state cannot
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mark of fairness in a regime committed to the rule of law.” To be
sure, geographical variances in the definition of legal rules might
make sense in some contexts, such as adjustment of environmental
regulations to local conditions. Variances in the application of a uniform rule caused by geographic location and divergent judicial interpretations, however, may readily be perceived as irrational and un442
fair.
As a close corollary to fairness, uniformity in bankruptcy would
reduce the incentive of debtors (or creditors, in involuntary cases) to
forum shop in order to place the case in a venue that favors their interests to the detriment of other parties. Forum shopping is undesirable because of the perception that results depend on geography and
443
not the substance of the case.
The lack of uniformity in U.S. bankruptcy law is inherently unfair. The biggest beneficiaries are large business debtors that have a
range of choices where to file and can use forum selection in ways
444
that other debtors cannot. These debtors can make the most of favorable case precedent and state laws. Wealthy consumer debtors can
also fare better in bankruptcy than other debtors if they live in states
with unlimited homestead exemptions and/or high personal445
property exemptions. The biggest losers from the lack of uniformity are consumer debtors in states with low property exemptions or
where case precedent or trustee policies are more favorable to credi446
tors.
4. Coherence
A detailed analysis of the Supreme Court’s considerations in selecting cases for certiorari is beyond the scope of this Article. A major factor in granting certiorari, however, is uniformity in the application of federal law. Professor Peter Strauss writes that “[t]he premise
of certiorari jurisdiction is that the Court will select for hearing those
cases whose resolution is likely to make the largest contribution to

justifiably permit the parties in one of its courtrooms to be treated in a manner that
is at variance with how they (or any other set of litigants) would be treated in the
courtroom next door.”).
441
Caminker, supra note 440, at 39.
442
Id.
443
Id.
444
See supra notes 431–32 and accompanying text.
445
See supra notes 90–102 and accompanying text.
446
See supra notes 90–102, 116–20 and accompanying text.
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447

the uniformity and cohesion of national law.” Principles of justice
and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution “all speak of an inte448
grated and coherent body of law.” According to Strauss, the telling
symptom of lack of coherence is the “balkanization” of federal law
where geographical factors influence the ways that courts weigh deci449
sions.
As a result, parties whose activities cross circuit (or state)
boundaries can be subject to conflicting regimes of the same federal
450
law.
Professor Evan Carminker presents additional arguments in favor of uniform interpretation of federal law. First, he notes, rules allow parties to structure their relationships in a socially productive
451
way. Parties must be able to rely on rules in advance; therefore, the
rules must be knowable and predictable. In systems such as the United States with multiple potential legal venues for dispute resolution,
452
uniformity is a prerequisite to predictability.
In addition, uniform interpretation and implementation of federal law allows for more effective administration by the executive
branch. Without uniform interpretation and implementation of these laws, those who administer the laws in different jurisdictions face
different options and even different duties when confronted with
453
similar situations.
Finally, uniform interpretation of federal law promotes overall
respect for judicial authority. If the same federal law means one
thing in one court, and another thing in another court, people may
perceive that courts are either unprincipled, incompetent, or that the
454
law is indeterminate. Any of these undermines judicial credibility.
Not all writers concede to the virtue of uniformity. Professor
455
Amanda Frost believes that uniformity is overvalued.
She argues
447
Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093,
1100–01 (1987).
448
Id. at 1097.
449
Id. at 1107.
450
Id.
451
Caminker, supra note 440, at 38.
452
Id. at 38–39.
453
Id. at 39.
454
Id. at 40 n.148 (“If interpretation of [the Constitution], which manifests our
agreement on long term associational values, varies from state to state, respect for
and confidence in the document is undermined.” (quoting Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929, 941 (1982))).
455
Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008).
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that there is no evidence that the sociological legitimacy of federal
456
law is undermined by differing judicial interpretations and that the
federalist system establishes that citizens of different states will be
457
treated differently based on state law.
Additionally, she finds that
differences in judicial interpretations of federal law may be even
more legitimate than one single interpretation because “they better
reflect the diverse preferences of federal legislators and their constit458
uencies.”
Furthermore, she observes, nowhere does Article III of
the Constitution assign to federal courts the task of establishing uni459
Yet Frost acknowledges that
form interpretations of federal law.
uniformity may be required for some laws. She notes that because
Article I provides Congress with the power to establish “an uniform
Rule of Naturalization” and “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies” and requires that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be
uniform, this shows that “the Framers were concerned about uni460
formity of federal law . . . in these narrow areas.” Thus, even a critic
of uniformity acknowledges that congressional exercise of these powers should be uniform.
B. Uniformity as a Constitutional Mandate
461

Article I of the Constitution grants specific powers to Congress.
Of the enumerated powers, three are qualified by the requirement
462
that laws or rules made pursuant thereto be “uniform.” These pow463
ers include taxation, naturalization, and bankruptcy. Article I provides as follows:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises . . . ; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall
be uniform throughout the United States;
....
To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws
464
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.

The naturalization power is exercised as a “rule,” the bankruptcy
465
power through “laws,” and the taxing power is described by its
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464

Id. at 1593.
Id. at 1594–95.
Id. at 1589.
Id. at 1620.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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forms—taxes, duties, imposts, and excises. Notwithstanding the different manner in which these powers are manifest, they are alike in
that each is to be “uniform.” No other powers in the Constitution are
qualified in this way. The Framers considered whether “[t]o establish
an uniform & general system of discipline for the Militia of these
States,” but the proposal was rejected due to the perceived need for
466
variety and autonomy among the states.
This suggests that in the
minds of the Framers, “uniformity” was inconsistent with state autonomy (i.e., a “uniform” federal power preempts state law). In addition, uniformity was also likely intended to prevent Congress from
discriminating in favor of one state or region—a key theme of the
467
Constitutional Convention.
It can be asked whether the Framers intended the word “uniform” to have the same meaning for each of these three powers. As a
general rule of construction, the same word used in the same statute
468
is considered to have the same meaning with each use.
Another
rule states that if there is no legal or technical definition of a word in
the Constitution, the Framers intended the word to have its “plain
469
meaning.”
A 1828 dictionary defined the word “uniform” as “having the same form or manner, not variable,” “consistent with itself,”
470
and “conforming to one rule or mode.” Thus, applying the “plain
meaning” rule, the uniformity requirement means just what it says:
laws enacted pursuant to the taxing, naturalization, and bankruptcy

465
As to the reason for bankruptcy “laws,” Kurt H. Nadelmann explains that the
plural was intended so that Congress could pass different types of laws for different
types of debtors. Kurt H. Nadelmann , On the Origins of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 215, 227 (1957). In contrast, as there is only one type of naturalization,
it is logical that the power is exercised as a “rule.”
466
Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 22, 39 (1983) (quoting 2
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 386 (Max Farrand ed., 1911))
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
467
Id. at 37–38. Professor Koffler believes that the word “uniform” is a restriction
on congressional power. She describes uniformity as “circumscribing” and limiting
congressional power so that Congress could not use these specified powers to discriminate against particular states or regions. Id.
468
See, e.g., Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982, 990 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Where a
word is given a consistent meaning throughout the United States Code, then the
courts assume that it has the same meaning in any particular instance of that word.”).
469
Anthony J. Bellia, State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 1501, 1532 (2006). Professor Bellia suggests that under modes of statutory construction in the early republic, in absence of specific legal, technical, or statutory evidence to the contrary, the Framers would have intended their words to be interpreted according to plain meaning. See id. at 1532–33.
470
Webster, supra note 3.
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powers must be consistent and not subject to substantially different
variations in practice.
The fact that the Framers used “uniform” three times in close
proximity shows that they intended something consistent and particular about the exercise of these three powers, as distinct from the oth471
er powers.
The following discussion will consider how uniformity
applies to the revenue, naturalization, and bankruptcy powers.
1. Revenue Uniformity
There are relatively few decisions that address what uniform
472
taxing power means.
Commentators suggest that uniformity in
connection with the taxing power was intended to prevent states from
473
“ganging up” to impose discriminatory taxes on less powerful states.
This served as reassurance for centralization and “virtual abandon474
ment of ‘states’ rights’ principles.”
475
A leading case on tax uniformity is Knowlton v. Moore. In that
476
case, the plaintiffs were beneficiaries of a decedent’s estate. While
the estate was valued at over $2,600,000, the various beneficiaries re477
ceived amounts ranging from $1,500,000 to less than $10,000. The
War Revenue Act of 1898 imposed a graduated tax upon legacies, beginning with no tax on legacies of less than $10,000 and going up to
478
2.25% on amounts over $100,000. The IRS collector fixed the tax
rate for all distributions based on the value of the entire estate, which
substantially increased the amount of tax paid compared to the rate
479
that would have applied if the legacies were taxed separately. The
executor paid the tax under protest and then sought recovery

471
For example, there is no requirement that the commerce powers be exercised
in a uniform manner. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69
(1982).
472
In one of the early cases, Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 174 (1796), the
Court rejected a challenge by New York plaintiffs to a tax imposed on carriages on
the grounds that there were more carriages in New York than in less populous states
such as Virginia, finding that the uniformity clause required “geographic,” not “intrinsic” uniformity.
473
See Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 276–77 (2005); Gale Ann Norton, The Limitless Federal
Taxing Power, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 591, 599 (1985).
474
Norton, supra note 473, at 600.
475
178 U.S. 41 (1900).
476
Id. at 43.
477
Id. at 44.
478
Id. at 45.
479
Id. at 44–45
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480

through the district court.
The district court demurred, and the
481
demurer was sustained by the circuit court.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the
482
The first issue in the
tax must be imposed on a graduated basis.
483
case was whether Congress has the power to impose a “death tax.”
The Court answered in the affirmative, as it was an excise tax and not
484
a direct tax. The second issue concerned whether the Act’s gradu485
ated tax rate violated the uniformity clause. The Court weighed two
approaches. The first approach was “intrinsic uniformity,” which
means that wherever and however a tax is imposed, it must impose
486
exactly the same burden on anyone subject to the tax. Thus, if the
legacy tax required intrinsic uniformity, then the same burden of
2.25% per person would have to be imposed irrespective of the
487
amount of the legacy.
The other option considered by the Court
488
was “geographic uniformity.” Under geographic uniformity,
whatever plan or method Congress adopts for laying the tax in
question, the same plan and the same method must be made operative throughout the United States; that is to say, that wherever
a subject is taxed anywhere, the same must be taxed everywhere
489
throughout the United States, and at the same rate.

The Court found that “uniformity” could not mean inherent
uniformity, as this type of equality in taxation had never been the
490
rule in England or in any of the states.
Additionally, an inherent
equality standard would effectively prevent the government from exercising any taxing power because it could not tax one type of goods
491
without taxing another.
Thus, the Court adopted the rule of geographic uniformity, finding that such a rule forbids discrimination
“between the states, by the levying of duties, imposts, or excises upon
a particular subject in one state and a different duty, impost or excise

480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491

Id. at 45.
Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 45.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 84.
Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 84–85.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 88–89, 92–93.
Id.
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492

on the same subject in another.” This determination was informed
in part by the opinion in the Head Money Cases, which addressed
whether a tax imposed on the owners of steam vessels for each passenger from a foreign port landing in New York was void for violation
493
of the uniformity requirement. The Court in that case held,
The tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found. The tax in this
case . . . is an excise duty on the business of bringing passengers
from foreign countries into this [country] by ocean navigation, is
uniform and operates precisely alike in every port of the United
494
States where such passengers can be landed.

The Court noted that opponents of the taxing clause likewise
495
understood “uniformity” to mean geographic uniformity.
Some
delegates were concerned that geographic uniformity would result in
unequal taxation because if a particular type of product was to be
taxed, “a greater quantity of that article might be found in one state
496
than in other states.” Thus, a tax that may generate greater revenue
from one state and little or none from another state would still meet
the uniformity requirement if it is “laid to the same amount on the
497
same articles in each state.”
Lastly, the Court addressed the argument that states’ interests
could be accommodated by imposing the tax only on objects found
equally throughout all the states, so that one state is not burdened by
498
the federal excise more than any other state. The Court found that
if the interest of states were to be considered in this way, it would
“relegate the taxing power of Congress to the impotent condition in
499
which it was during the confederation.”
Congress may impose a tax that impacts different regions of
the country in different ways. In United States v. Ptasynski, the Court
rejected a challenge to a federal law that exempted a separate class of
500
“Alaskan oil” from a federal crude oil windfall profits tax. The tax
exemption did not violate the uniformity clause for the reason that,
due to its “unique climatic and geographic conditions,” Congress
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500

Id. at 90.
112 U.S. 580, 594 (1984).
Id.
Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 86–87.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 107–08.
Id. at 109.
462 U.S. 74, 78 (1983).
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could treat “Alaskan oil” as a separate class of oil.
The Court observed, however, that any tax treatment that appeared to frame a tax
in geographic terms would be examined closely to ensure that there
502
was a nongeographic basis for the tax.
Courts and commentators have cautioned against analogizing
503
tax uniformity too closely with bankruptcy uniformity. Yet, even the
Supreme Court in Ptasysnki found reason to compare the two by
drawing upon its prior discussion of bankruptcy uniformity in the Regional Railroad Reorganization Act Cases, which themselves relied upon
504
the Court’s discussion of tax uniformity in the Head Money Cases.
The Sixth Circuit in In re Hood also equated uniformity in imposing
taxes and duties with that of naturalization and bankruptcy, finding
that state retention of power to legislate in these areas violated the
505
requirement of uniformity.
Therefore, lessons from the tax uniformity cases can be instructive in understanding uniformity in the
context of bankruptcy.
The tax uniformity cases suggest that where classes of taxpayers
are created by a federal statute, different taxpayer classes can be treated differently, even if the effect of the treatment has a disparate impact because of geographic location. Thus in Knowlton, the rate of
tax that beneficiaries pay under a death tax statute could be different
506
(graduated) based upon the dollar amount received by each class.
In the Head Money Cases, the tax that each immigrant paid was the
507
same wherever he or she landed. And in Ptasynski, a category of oil
designated as “Alaskan oil” was exempt from the windfall profits tax
508
that applied to other types of crude oil.
But none of these cases
holds that different taxpayers within the same class may be treated
differently solely on the basis of geography. This would violate the
core principle of Knowlton: “[A] tax is uniform when it operates with the
509
same force and effect in every place where the subject is found.”
501

Id. at 84.
Id. at 85.
503
Schultz v. United States, 529 F.3d 343, 355 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he taxing power is wholly inapposite to that of the Bankruptcy Clause.”); see also Randolph J.
Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129, 166–
67 (2003).
504
Ptasysnki, 462 U.S. at 83–84.
505
319 F.3d 755, 768(6th Cir. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
506
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 90 (1900).
507
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884).
508
Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 78.
509
Id. at 86 (emphasis added) (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at
594)(internal quotation marks omitted).
502
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The tax cases also teach that substantive deference to state law in
determining the scope of bankruptcy rights, such as bankruptcy exemptions and fundamental and prolonged differences in federal circuit precedent and local rules and practices—to the extent that these
result in substantively different bankruptcy outcomes—violate uniformity. The fact that separate classes of bankruptcy creditors may
receive different treatment in the distribution of the debtors’ assets
does not violate bankruptcy uniformity in the same way as allowing
separate classes of taxpayers to be taxed differently does not violate
uniformity of the taxing power. Under the meaning of uniformity as
drawn from the taxing cases, however, uniformity is violated to the
extent that members of the same class of creditors or the same type of
debtors are subject to substantially different outcomes in bankruptcy,
depending upon where the case is filed.
2. Naturalization Uniformity
510

Congress is empowered to enact a “rule” of naturalization. But
511
that authority is qualified in that such rule must be uniform. And,
as with the taxing and bankruptcy clauses, the Framers intended uniformity to remedy problems caused by inconsistent state laws dealing
512
with immigrants. James Madison explained:
The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization, has long been remarked as a fault in our system, and as laying a foundation for intricate and delicate questions . . . . In one State, residence for a
short term confers all the rights of citizenship; in another, qualifications of greater importance are required . . . . The new Constitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision
against them, and all others proceeding from the defect of the
Confederation on this head, by authorizing from the federal government to establish an uniform rule of naturalization through513
out the United States.

Similarly, Alexander Hamilton believed that uniformity meant
that federal power regarding naturalization must be exclusive “be510

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Id.
512
See, e.g., James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV.
359, 384–87 (2010); Iris Bennett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of ‘Aggravated Felony’ Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696, 1704–05,
1704 n.34 (1999) (collecting authorities on the varied naturalization practices among
the states and concluding that these inconsistencies lead to the adoption of the uniformity rule).
513
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 237 (James Madison)(Robert A. Ferguson ed.,
2006).
511
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cause if each state had power to prescribe a Distinct Rule there could
514
be no Uniform Rule.”
Cases dealing with uniformity and naturalization generally address whether state criminal or domestic relations statutes will be
used to interpret provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act
515
(INA).
A typical case may address whether a violation of a state
criminal statute can be grounds for deportation where the state law
punishes the crime more harshly or differently than a corresponding
federal statute. Some cases have deferred to state law, but many
516
courts treat the crime according to its federal definition.
In Nemetz v. INS, the Fourth Circuit considered whether a naturalization petitioner could be excluded from the United States on the
grounds of “moral turpitude” pursuant to the INA when the behavior
at issue was consensual homosexual activity that constituted the crim517
inal act of sodomy under Virginia law. The court opined that reference to state law for federal immigration purposes might be appropriate if “crimes against the public are treated fairly uniformly
518
throughout the country.” However, the court noted that a number
of states had decriminalized consensual sodomy and that similar stat519
utes in several other states had been ruled unconstitutional. Thus,
if the petitioner had lived in one of those states, his naturalization petition would not have been challenged by the INS and he would have
already been a citizen. The court found that a law of naturalization
based upon “an ‘accident of geography’ . . . . [h]ardly contributes to
any principle of uniformity and is, in fact, incongruous with common
520
sense.”
Indeed, the use of state law to define moral turpitude un-

514
THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 at 169 (Alexander Hamilton). Accordingly, authority
over immigration and naturalization is exclusively federal power. United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701 (1898).
515
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1525 (2006). Although federal naturalization power initially
addressed conditions for naturalization and the entry and removal of foreign nationals, the scope of federal regulation of immigration-related matters has grown over
the years to include the INA and other federal statutes governing the entry, removal,
naturalization, and employment eligibility of aliens in the United States. Yule Kim,
The Limits of State and Local Immigration Enforcement and Regulation, 3 ALB. GOV’T L.
REV. 242, 245 (2010).
516
See Bennett, supra note 512, at 1707–11; see also In re Briedis, 238 F. Supp. 149,
150 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (holding that defining adultery according to state law “would
lead to an absurb [sic] patchwork result, resting a petitioner’s right to United States
citizenship upon the whims and idiosyncrasies of individual state legislatures”).
517
647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1981).
518
Id. at 436.
519
Id. at 435.
520
Id.
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der the federal act undermines a uniform rule of naturalization.
“Such a practice would ‘permit state law to govern the creation of a
relationship (citizenship) . . . over which Congress has exclusive authority, a result that is directly contrary to the one intended by the
521
framers of the naturalization clause.’”
The uniformity standard is
violated when dispositive acts “are the subject of radically different
522
legislative treatment by the states.”
Additionally, “[w]hen use of
federal law defeats the uniformity requirement . . . the court must de523
vise a federal standard by other means.”
The Fifth Circuit in Nehme v. INS interpreted the uniformity
524
In Nehme, whether the petitioner was a citizen
standard similarly.
depended upon whether his parents had been “legally separated,” as
525
set forth in the INA, prior to petitioner’s eighteenth birthday. The
court emphasized that because of the constitutional requirement of
uniformity, it was inappropriate that “the law of any one state should
govern the determination of whether an alien’s parents were ‘legally
526
separated.’” Therefore, the court formulated a federal standard to
527
interpret the term “legal separation” for purposes of the INA. Oth528
er courts have adopted the reasoning in Nehme.
While federal interests are paramount in the field of immigration, not every state or local enactment that affects the rights of aliens
necessarily interferes with the federal interest. A state law only infringes upon immigration if it amounts to a determination of who
should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain. In DeCanas v. Bica, the

521

Id. at 435–36 (citation omitted).
Id. at 436.
523
Nemetz, 647 F.2d at 436.
524
252 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2001).
525
Id. at 419.
526
Id. at 423–24.
527
Id. at 426.
528
See Brisset v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Because the Constitution gives Congress the power to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ naturalization laws must ‘be construed according to a federal, rather than state, standard.’” (quoting Nehme, 252 F.3d at 422)); Alsol v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir.
2008) (finding that conviction for controlled substance possession under state law
was not a felony under the Controlled Substances Act for immigration purposes). In
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, the Court rejected the use of state law
definitions for purposes of the Indiana Child Welfare Act, since the ICWA was intended to be uniform throughout the United States. 490 U.S. 30, 43–44 (1989).
“[T]he cases in which we have found that Congress intended a state-law definition of
a statutory term have often been those where uniformity clearly was not intended.”
Id. at 43–44.
522
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Court remanded for reconsideration a challenge to a California law
that prohibited employment of persons unlawfully present in the
United States, finding that states have broad authority under their
police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect
workers within the state, and that the California law was “within the
529
mainstream of such police power regulation.” Because the law appeared to focus directly upon “local problems” and was tailored to
combat the perceived problems, the case was remanded to determine
530
whether the law was preempted by the INA.
More recently, in Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Whiting,
the Court acknowledged federal preemption over laws affecting immigration, but observed that states have authority to “regulate the
531
employment relationship to protect workers within the state.”
In
upholding an Arizona law that allowed suspension and revocation of
532
business licenses for employing unauthorized aliens,
the Court
533
found that the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) ex534
pressly excepted state “licensing and similar law” from preemption.
More importantly, the Arizona law in no way impeded or supplemented the IRCA. For example, the law adopted the federal definition of an unauthorized alien as well as other key definitions in the
IRCA, prohibited state investigators from making a final determination on whether an alien is authorized to work in the United States,
and directed that state courts “shall consider only the federal government’s determination” when deciding whether an employee is an un535
authorized alien. Accordingly, the Court found that “there can by
definition be no conflict between state and federal law as to worker
536
authorization, either at the investigatory or adjudicatory stage.”
Therefore, the state law did not conflict with federal immigration
537
law.
529

424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).
Id. at 357.
531
131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974 (2011).
532
The Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007 allows Arizona courts to suspend or
revoke the licenses necessary to do business in the state if an employer knowingly or
intentionally employs an unauthorized alien. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211, -212, 212.01 (2010).
533
Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.) The IRCA amended the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006) .
534
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977.
535
Id. at 1981–83.
536
Id.
537
Id. at 1987.
530
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Court cases dealing with naturalization establish that uniformity
and federal exclusivity over immigration law are paramount. Uniformity under the naturalization clause helps illuminate the meaning
of “uniform” with respect to the bankruptcy power. As one bankruptcy court has stated, “Given the structure of the Constitution and
the Framers’ decision to use the word ‘uniform’ in both cases, it appears that the Framers intended to treat the powers given to Congress
538
over naturalization and bankruptcy as identical in scope.”
The Arizona state law in Whiting is analogous to the authority
that a state court has to determine whether a debt has been discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding. As with business licensing, enforcing property rights is a typical state function. Thus, it is properly
within the authority of a state court to review a bankruptcy case docket to determine if a debt has been discharged for purposes of ruling
whether a creditor can use state law means to enforce a debt. A state
court does not have authority to decide whether a debt may be discharged in bankruptcy, just as Arizona state courts do not have authority to decide whether a worker may be authorized to work in the
United States. Employment authorization, as with discharge of debt,
is exclusively under federal jurisdiction, pursuant to the uniformity
clause. Laws that make immigration status subject to state law violate
the naturalization uniformity requirement. Applying the same analogy to bankruptcy law, laws that make discharge of debt subject to
state law violate the bankruptcy uniformity requirement.
3. Bankruptcy Uniformity
i.

Background of the Bankruptcy Clause

The history of the Bankruptcy Clause has been treated in detail
539
elsewhere. What the clause was specifically intended to accomplish
is unclear because there is very little recorded debate on the subject
540
of bankruptcy during the Constitutional Convention.
The clause
was included in the Constitution on motion by Charles Pinckney fol541
Thus, it
lowing a discussion on conflicts in interstate commerce.
538
Gray v. Fla. State Univ. (In re Dehon, Inc.), 327 B.R. 38, 54 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2005) (quoting In re Hood, 319 F.3d 755, 766 (6th Cir. 2003)).
539
See, e.g., BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002); Nadelmann, supra note 465.
540
See, e.g., In re Dehon, Inc., 327 B.R. 38, 52 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (“Therefore,
in looking to the convention debates alone, this Court can discern no clear intent of
the Framers regarding the retention or alteration of the States’ sovereign immunity
with respect to the bankruptcy power.”).
541
Nadelmann, supra note 465, at 217–20.
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appears that the Framers believed uniform national bankruptcy laws
were necessary for effective interstate commerce.
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie, or
be removed into different states, that the expediency of it seems
542
not likely to be drawn into question.

Among other things, the Framers were concerned about the
543
patchwork of different bankruptcy laws among the states, including
the fact that debtors who had been discharged from debts in one
state could be imprisoned for the same debts upon travelling to an544
other state.
A national bankruptcy law would help alleviate these
impediments to commerce.
While commentators agree that commerce was the reason behind the Bankruptcy Clause, there is disagreement as to the intended
purpose of uniformity of the bankruptcy law. A leading theory in this
debate is “proceduralism,” which asserts that bankruptcy is intended
to be a procedural forum in which to adjudicate the state law rights of
545
creditors. In contrast, Judge Randolph Haines argues that the word
“uniform” in the Bankruptcy Clause was intended as a grant of power,
not a restriction of power, and that the Framers’ purpose in using the
word was to supersede state sovereignty in bankruptcy law (i.e., that

542

THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 238 (James Madison); see James Monroe Olmstead,
Bankruptcy: A Commercial Regulation, 15 HARV. L. REV. 829, 831 (1902) (“The Bankruptcy Clause in the Constitution . . . was akin to or closely related to commerce.”).
543
See MANN, supra note 539, at 59–60 (noting that some states had no insolvency
laws, while others provided for release from debtor’s prison but not for discharge of
debt). Pennsylvania allowed for discharge of unpaid debts but only for commercial
debtors. Id.; see also Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN.
L. REV. 487, 518–25 (1996) (reviewing the difference in state bankruptcy laws prior to
the Constitution).
544
Nadelmann, supra note 465, at 224–25.
545
See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 430, at 901. Professor Jackson states that the purpose of bankruptcy law is to uphold the rights that creditors negotiated with the
debtor under state law prior to the bankruptcy. Id. at 873 n.77. Douglas G. Baird
believes that bankruptcy law is a procedure through which state-created rights are
recognized. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure and State-Created Rights: The Lessons of Gibbons and Marathon, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 25, 47. Charles W. Mooney articulates a fully developed theory of proceduralism. Charles W. Mooney, A Normative
Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931,
944 (2004) (“[N]onbankruptcy law creates, defines, and shapes the contours of the
legal entitlements of a debtor’s rightsholders . . . .”). For a concise discussion of the
“proceduralist” model, see Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 617–19 (2008).
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states would be subject to national bankruptcy law). Professor Jonathon Lipson suggests that the real purpose of the Bankruptcy Clause
was to enable Congress to preempt rogue or extreme state bankruptcy laws in the event that states began to enact bankruptcy laws that
547
were overly protective of their own debtors or creditors. Similarly,
Professor Judith Schenck Koffler sees the Bankruptcy Clause as a
grant of power to safeguard the nation’s interest in establishing and
maintaining a single market for the extension of credit without inter548
ference from parochial action by states. Still another commentator
concludes that the purpose of bankruptcy uniformity was to place adjudication of the complex disputes that arise in administering a bank549
ruptcy case in a single federal court.
Given the scant historical record left by the Framers, it is not
surprising that there is disagreement regarding uniformity and the
Bankruptcy Clause. Unfortunately, court opinions on the subject are
not very illuminating either.
ii. The Supreme Court on Bankruptcy Uniformity
The list of Supreme Court cases directly relevant to uniformity in
550
bankruptcy is short. Only two cases, Hanover National Bank v. Moyses
551
and Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, attempt an original
analysis of what bankruptcy uniformity requires, and those cases are
amenable to radically different interpretations. There are a handful
of other decisions that color in some details and merit a brief discussion.
a. Hanover National Bank v. Moyses
The Moyses case addressed a constitutional challenge to the
552
1898 Bankruptcy Act.
The Act provided for discharge of personal
debts, but incorporated the state law exemptions of the state where
553
the case was filed. Moyses, a citizen of Missouri, executed a promissory note that was indorsed to the plaintiff, Hanover Bank, in New
546

Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different, 77 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 129, 171, 176 (2003).
547
Lipson, supra note 545, at 605, 631.
548
Koffler, supra note 466, at 41.
549
1 HAROLD REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 13, at 17 (James M. Henderson ed., 5th ed. 1950).
550
186 U.S. 181 (1902).
551
546 U.S. 356 (2006).
552
Moyses, 186 U.S. 181.
553
Id. at 189.
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554

York.
Moyses defaulted under the note and Hanover Bank ob555
tained judgment in a Missouri state court. Thereafter, Moyses
556
moved to Tennessee and filed a petition for bankruptcy.
The district court granted a discharge of his debt, allowing him to use the
557
Tennessee exemptions. Hanover Bank appealed, alleging that the
Bankruptcy Act was unconstitutional because, inter alia, by incorporating state exemption laws, which varied from state to state, the Act
558
did not establish “uniform laws” on bankruptcies.
The Court rejected the bank’s “personal uniformity” argument and found instead
559
that “uniformity is geographical,” which meant that the Act was uniform in the constitutional sense “when the trustee takes in each state
whatever would have been available to the creditor if the bankruptcy
law had not been passed. The general operation of the law is uniform although it may result in certain particulars differently in differ560
ent states.”
Under this standard, bankruptcy law satisfies the uniformity requirement if a creditor would be treated in the same fashion in bankruptcy as he would be outside of bankruptcy under state law, even if
561
the laws in different states provide for different treatment.
This
562
view essentially represents the “proceduralist” model cited above.
The legacy of Moyses (at least until Katz) is that “geographic uniformity” has been the standard for analyzing uniformity under the
563
Bankruptcy Code.
Under Moyses, the requirement of uniformity
prevents Congress from enacting geographically specific bankruptcy
laws but does not require Congress to prohibit “interstate bankruptcy
564
variance.” Notwithstanding its longevity as precedent, Moyses suffers
554

Id. at 182.
Id.
556
Id.
557
Id. at 183.
558
Moyses, 186 U.S. at 185.
559
Id. at 188.
560
Id. at 190.
561
Id. As the Court explained, “no creditor can reasonably complain if he gets his
full share of all that the law . . . places at the disposal of creditors.” Id. at 189.
562
See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 545.
563
See, e.g., Stellwagon v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918) (noting that a bankruptcy law may be uniform and yet “recognize the laws of the state in certain particulars,
although such recognition may lead to different results in different states”); Schultz
v. United States, 529 F.3d 343, 351 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The Court . . . has consistently
described the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity requirement as ‘geographical, and not
personal.’” (quoting Moyses, 186 U.S. at 188)).
564
Joseph Pace, Note, Bankruptcy as Constitutional Property: Using Statutory Entitlement Theory to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 119 YALE L.J. 1568, 1592 (2010).
555
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from a number of flaws. First, the Court attempted to delineate between state and federal bankruptcy powers, stating that
“[s]o long as there is no national bankruptcy act, each state has
full authority to pass insolvent laws binding persons and property
within its jurisdiction, provided it does not impair the obligation
of existing contracts; but a state cannot by such a law discharge
one of its own citizens from his contracts with citizens of other
565
States . . . .”

This part of the Moyses opinion refers to the fact that while federal laws may impair contract obligations, the states are prohibited
from doing so. Yet, this is exactly the effect of incorporating state exemption laws into federal bankruptcy law. By allowing the individual
states to control the scope of assets exempt from a debtor’s bankruptcy estate, the states discharge their citizens from obligations to
creditors from other states. Thus, the 1898 Bankruptcy Act failed the
Court’s own definition of uniformity. As discussed above, the current
Bankruptcy Code gives states power to impose their exemptions in
566
bankruptcy.
Therefore, the present Bankruptcy Code would also
fail the uniformity requirement cited in Moyses.
Professor Judith Koffler has identified additional problems with
Moyses. As she points out, the Court adopted its geographic uniformity standard from two circuit court decisions that arose under the
567
568
Bankruptcy Act of 1867—In re Beckerford and In re Deckert. In doing so, the Court ignored its own detailed discussion of uniformity
569
just two years earlier in Knowlton v. Moore. This was a shaky foundation for a constitutional construct of uniformity. First, the 1867 Act
contained both federal exemptions and state exemptions, unlike the
570
1898 Act, which used state exemptions only. More importantly, the
Beckerford and Deckert opinions do not support the holding in Moyses.
In Beckerford, the court reasoned that incorporation of state exemptions did not violate the uniformity provision because, “[t]hough
the states vary in the extent of their exemptions, yet, what remains
571
[of] the bankruptcy law distributes equally among the creditors.”
Since no creditor could receive more from his debtor under state law
than the unexempted part of the debtor’s assets, the court concluded
565
566
567
568
569
570
571

Moyses, 186 U.S. at 188 (quoting Brown v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454, 457 (1892)).
See discussion supra Part II.C.1.i.a.
3 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mo. 1870) (No. 1209).
7 F. Cas. 334 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1874) (No. 3728); Moyses, 186 U.S. at 189–90.
Koffler, supra note 466, at 75.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 62 (citing In re Beckerford, 3 F. Cas. at 27).
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572

that the law was uniform.
Put another way, the bankruptcy law is
uniform because it uniformly incorporates the exemption law of each
state. Yet, as Professor Koffler points out, under this logic, a bankruptcy law would be uniform even if it allowed each state to exempt
all of a debtor’s property, none of a debtor’s property, or even to de573
termine whether to grant bankruptcy debtors a discharge at all. A
complete exemption of all property would frustrate creditors completely and dry up credit in the state, whereas no exemptions or no
discharge would significantly undermine the federal policy of a “fresh
574
start.”
The second case cited by the Moyses Court, Deckert, dealt with an
1873 amendment to the 1867 Act. The Court cited dicta from Deckert
to the effect that bankruptcy law is “uniform” if it allows “all the creditors of the bankrupt [to] reach all his property subject to levy” under
575
state law. But this was not the issue in the case. In 1872, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that the Virginia homestead and personal
576
property exemptions violated the federal contract clause.
In response, Congress passed an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act stating that the exemptions under the Act should be the exemptions as
577
they existed under the laws of each state in 1871. Thus, debtors filing bankruptcy in Virginia subsequent to the 1873 amendment could
578
claim exemptions that were no longer available under Virginia law.
The Deckert court found the amendment to be in violation of the constitutional mandate of uniformity because it provided “that there
shall be one amount or description of exemption in Virginia and another in Pennsylvania . . . . It changes existing rights between the
debtor and creditor. Such changes, to be warranted by the Constitu579
tion, must be uniform in their operation.” As Professor Koffler observes, Deckert read the word “uniform” to prohibit Congress from ex580
ercising its power to impair contracts, which is clearly wrong.
Accordingly, Deckert does not lend any support for the decision in
Moyses.
572

Id.
Id. at 63, 65–66.
574
Id.
575
Moyses, 186 U.S. at 190 (quoting In re Deckert, 7 F. Cas. 334, 336 (C.C.E.D. Va.
1874) (No. 3728).
576
The Homestead Cases, 63 Va. (22 Gratt) 26 (1872).
577
See Koffer, supra note 481 at 69.
578
Id. at 62.
579
In re Deckert, 7 F. Cas. 334, 336 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1874) (No. 3728).
580
Koffler, supra note 466, at 71.
573
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Finally, although both Moyses and Knowlton are based on the doctrine of “geographic uniformity,” each case used the term quite differently. Under Knowlton, geographic uniformity means that all similarly situated taxpayers must pay the same rate under a federal tax law
irrespective of their geographic location. It does not require that dif581
ferent classes of taxpayers pay the same rate of tax. In contrast, geographic uniformity in Moyses means that the remedy that a creditor
has against a debtor in a bankruptcy case must be the same remedy
that the creditor would have against the same debtor in a state court
582
proceeding.
The theory behind this rule is to prevent vertical forum shopping between state court and bankruptcy court within the
583
The very act of filing for bankruptcy, however, estabsame state.
lishes that the debtor has rights in relation to a creditor that the
debtor would not have outside of bankruptcy; this is precisely why a
debtor files for bankruptcy. As a result, this type of intrastate “forum
shopping” will occur anyway. Additionally, differences in bankruptcy
relief between states can and do give rise to interstate forum shop584
ping. Therefore, using uniformity as a means to alleviate intrastate
forum shopping is misguided from the start.
b.

Central Virginia Community College v. Katz

The central issue in that case was whether the Chapter 7 trustee
administering the bankruptcy of a bookstore chain was barred by the
doctrine of state sovereign immunity from bringing a preference
complaint against a state-sponsored college pursuant to § 547 of the
585
Code.
The trustee brought an adversary complaint to recover an
alleged preferential transfer against Central Virginia Community Col-

581

Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 105–06 (1900).
Moyses, 186 U.S. at 190.
583
This was the reason cited in Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)
(“Uniform treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts within a
State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a
party from receiving ‘a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.’”(quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 606, 609 (1961)).
584
Robert K. Rassmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum
Shopping By Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1365 (2000).
585
Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 360 (2006). Section 547 allows a
trustee in bankruptcy to recover certain transfers by the debtor to a pre-petition
creditor made within ninety days prior to filing for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 547
(2006). For an in-depth recitation of the facts and case law history leading up to
Katz, see Daniel A. Austin, The Bankruptcy Clause and the Eleventh Amendment: An Uncertain Boundary Between Federalism and State Sovereignty, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 383, 412–24
(2007).
582
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586

lege (CVCC). CVCC moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that
§ 106 of the Code, which provides that the sovereign immunity of a
governmental unit is abrogated with respect to certain sections of the
Bankruptcy Code (including recovery of preferential payments under
587
588
§ 547), was unconstitutional.
The bankruptcy court denied
CVCC’s motion to dismiss, and the district court and Sixth Circuit af589
firmed. CVCC appealed.
The Court ruled that CVCC and any other state agencies are
bound by bankruptcy court jurisdiction in the same way as other
creditors. The Court reached this decision by first finding that the
Framers’ purpose in drafting the uniform bankruptcy clause was to
harmonize the “patchwork of insolvency and bankruptcy laws” that
590
were particular to the American divided (state) authority. Second,
based on the historical record, the Court determined that the Framers intended the term “subject of Bankruptcies” to be broadly construed and to include all aspects of the “relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending
591
to his and their relief.” Therefore, the bankruptcy power must include, inter alia, authority to avoid preferential transfers and recover
592
property on behalf of the estate.
Third, given the broad needs of
bankruptcy jurisdiction, in ratifying the Constitution, the states had
586

Katz v. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll., 546 U.S. 356, 360 (2006).
Section 106 provides in part:
(a) Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign
immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth
in this section… .
....
(2) The court may hear and determine any issue arising with respect to
the application of such provisions to governmental units.
11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(2)(2006).
588
Katz, 546 U.S. at 360.
589
Id. at 356.
590
Id. at 366 (noting that the “uncoordinated actions of multiple sovereigns, each
laying claim to the debtor’s body and effects” made a single discharge of a debtor
impossible).
591
Id. at 371 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co.,
304 U.S. 502, 513–14 (1938)). Regarding the scope of bankruptcy power, the Supreme Court stated as follows in In re Klein:
[The bankruptcy power] extends to all cases where the law causes to be
distributed the property of the debtor among his creditors; this is its
least limit. Its greatest, is a discharge of the debtor from his contracts.
And all intermediate legislation, affecting substance and form, but
tending to further the great end of the subject—distribution and discharge—are in the competency and discretion of Congress.
In re Klein, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 265, 281(1843).
592
Katz, 546 U.S. at 372.
587
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agreed to refrain from asserting the sovereign immunity defense in
proceedings brought pursuant to “Laws on the subject of Bankrupt593
cies.” In other words, the states agreed to subordinate their sovereign immunity to the extent necessary to effectuate the jurisdiction of
594
the bankruptcy court.
Therefore, it was within the authority of
Congress to provide for waiver of state sovereign immunity under §
595
106.
This analysis would have been sufficient to dispose of the issue
before the Court, but the majority in Katz went further. In a footnote, the Court stated that uniformity under the bankruptcy clause
means that “Congress has the power to enact bankruptcy laws the
purpose of which are to ensure uniformity in treatment of state and
596
private creditors.”
To provide support for this conclusion, the
Court reached back 185 years to Sturges v. Crowninshield, in which the
Court said of the uniformity clause, “Congress is not authorized
merely to pass laws, the operation of which shall be uniform, but to
597
establish uniform laws on the subject throughout the United States.”
Pushed to its logical conclusion, this would seem to require Congress
to harmonize the bankruptcy laws so that the treatment of parties in a
bankruptcy case is indistinguishable from the standpoint of geography. This is because, as the Court found, bankruptcy uniformity cannot tolerate states-creditors being treated differently from non-state
creditors. If bankruptcy uniformity demands that there be no differentiation between creditors based on private versus state status—
notwithstanding that state sovereign immunity is enshrined in the
Eleventh Amendment—then it must also demand that there be no
differentiation between creditors based on state boundaries. This is a
radical extension of prior uniformity jurisprudence. Not surprisingly,
598
599
Katz has drawn both criticism and praise.

593

Id. at 377.
Id. at 378.
595
Id. at 379.
596
Id. at 377 n.13.
597
Katz, 546 U.S. at 377 n.13 (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
122, 193–94 (1819)).
598
See, e.g., Ralph Brubaker, Explaining Katz’s New Bankruptcy Exception to State Sovereign Immunity: The Bankruptcy Power as a Federal Forum Power, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 95 (2007); Martin H. Redish & Daniel M. Greenfield, Bankruptcy, Sovereign Immunity and the Dilemma of Principled Decision Making: The Curious Case of Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 13 (2007).
599
See, e.g., Randolph J. Haines, Federalism Principles in Bankruptcy After Katz, 15 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 135 (2007); Susan E. Hauser, Necessary Fictions: Bankruptcy Jurisdiction After Hood and Katz, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1181, 1233 (2008).
594
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Vanston, Butner, and the Rail Road Cases

There are several decisions that did not attempt to formulate the
meaning of uniformity, but assist in illuminating its application.
The question in Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green
was whether interest owed by the debtor on certain bonds would be
paid at a higher rate pursuant to the law of New York, where the
bonds were signed and payable, or at a lower rate under the law of
600
Kentucky, where the bankruptcy court was located.
The Court stated as a general premise that the claims of creditors and obligations of the debtor “at the time a petition in bankruptcy is filed” should, in absence of an overruling federal law, be deter601
mined by reference to state law. The Court, however, would use a
different rule once the debtor was in bankruptcy:
In determining what claims are allowable and how a debtor’s assets shall be distributed, a Bankruptcy court does not apply the
law of the state where it sits . . . . [b]ut bankruptcy courts must . . .
determine how and what claims shall be allowed under equitable
602
principles.

In this case, the Court found that payment of interest on interest un603
der the New York law was “not consistent with equitable principles.”
But a concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter suggests that he may
have been uncomfortable with a wholesale adoption of federal or equitable principles in construing property rights in bankruptcy. He
stated that “[t]he existence of a debt between the parties to an alleged creditor-debtor relationship is independent of bankruptcy and
precedes it. Parties are in a bankruptcy court with their rights and
duties already established, except insofar as they subsequently arise
604
during the course of bankruptcy administration . . . .”
While Justice Frankfurter confirms the rights and duties are “already established” before bankruptcy, he acknowledges that those
rights can be amended in the course of “bankruptcy administra605
tion.” A later comment by Justice Frankfurter is equally ambiguous:
“The Constitutional requirement of uniformity is a requirement of
geographic uniformity. It is wholly satisfied when existing obligations
of a debtor are treated alike by the bankruptcy administration
600

329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946). New York law allowed payment of interest on interest, whereas Kentucky law permitted only simple interest. Id.
601
Id. at 161.
602
Id. at 162–63.
603
Id. at 166.
604
Id. at 169 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
605
Id. at 169.
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throughout the country regardless of the State in which the bank606
ruptcy court sits.”
At least one interpretation of Vanston is that state law may not be
used to differentiate between property rights of parties in bankruptcy.
Vanston has never been vacated, but it is certainly qualified by the
607
subsequent case of Butner v. United States. Furthermore, bankruptcy
courts rarely, if ever, use their equitable powers to supersede state law
608
in bankruptcy.
Butner v. United States confirmed the rule that property rights in
bankruptcy are defined by state law. In Butner, a business debtor attempting to reorganize entered into an agreement with a secured
creditor, Butner, to consolidate various liens against real property in
609
North Carolina.
The security agreement did not address rents
earned by the property. An agent was appointed by the court to collect rents and apply them to tax, mortgage, and other obligations;
when the reorganization proved unsuccessful, the court appointed a
610
trustee to liquidate the assets.
Butner was still owed money after
the liquidation, and thus the issue was whether a secured creditor was
611
entitled to rents from the collateral. North Carolina law defined a
612
security interest in real property to include rents from the property.
Relying on precedent from other jurisdictions, however, the lower
courts decided against the creditor, finding that since a bankruptcy
court had power to deprive a mortgagee of his state law remedy,
613
property rights were to be determined by federal law.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that while
Congress clearly has power under the uniformity clause to define a
mortgagee’s interest in rents, it “has generally left the determination
614
of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt estate to state law.”
According to the Court, deference to state law in bankruptcy is a
choice made by Congress: “Property interests are created and defined
by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result,
606

Green, 329 U.S. at 172. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
440 U.S. 48 (1979).
608
See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. of Highland Superstores v. Strobeck Real Estate (In re Highland Superstores), 154 F.3d 573, 578 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Bankruptcy courts simply do not have free rein to ignore a statute in the exercise of their equitable powers . . . .”).
609
Butner, 440 U.S. at 50.
610
Id.
611
Id. at 51.
612
Id.
613
Id. at 52–53.
614
Id. at 54.
607
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there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently
simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy pro615
ceeding.”
As Butner shows, property rights originate under state law. Bankruptcy can intervene procedurally to modify a creditor’s state-law
rights, but bankruptcy is not intended to be substantive law that creates property rights. The obvious qualification to Butner, however, is
that federal bankruptcy law overtly supercedes state law by modifying
creditor’s rights. State law is clearly the starting point for property
rights, but there is no basis to conclude that such rights are inviolate
in bankruptcy.
In Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance Corp. (The Regional
Rail Reorganization Act Cases), the Court considered whether the Regional Rail Reorganization Act violated the uniformity clause when
616
the Act operated only within a single statutorily defined region.
The Court held that it did not because there was no other railroad
proceeding taking place outside that region: “The Rail Act operates
uniformly upon all bankrupt railroads then operating in the United
States and uniformly with respect to all creditors of each of these rail617
roads.”
The fact that the Act had a purely regional effect did not
invalidate it since “the uniformity provision does not deny Congress
power to take into account differences that exist between different
parts of the country, and to fashion legislation to resolve geograph618
ically isolated problems.” In this sense, the rule in the Regional Rail
Reorganization Cases was similar to the rule in Ptasynski—congressional
exercise of the bankruptcy and taxing powers to address a strictly regional matter is not nonuniform as long as a hypothetical debtor or
creditor, wherever located, would be treated equally.
In another case, Railway Labor Executive Ass’n v. Gibbons, the
Court ruled that select bankruptcy relief violated the uniformity
619
clause. That case dealt with a federal statute, the Rock Island Transition and Employee Assistance Act, which, by its terms, applied to
only one regional bankrupt railroad during a time when there were
620
other railroads in reorganization proceedings.
The Court stated
that the Bankruptcy Clause does not impair the ability of Congress to

615
616
617
618
619
620

Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.
419 U.S. 102 (1974).
Id. at 159.
Id.
455 U.S. 457 (1982).
Id. at 470.
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define classes of debtors and to structure separate relief according621
ly. However,
[a] law can hardly be said to be uniform throughout the country
if it applies only to one debtor and can be enforced only by the
one bankruptcy court having jurisdiction over the debtor.
....
To survive scrutiny under the Bankruptcy Clause, a law must at
622
least apply uniformly to a defined class of debtors.

Thus, Gibbons reinforces the principle that bankruptcy law may provide for different treatment to separate classes of creditors, but that
members within a class must be treated uniformly.
IV. BANKRUPTCY AND CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY
There are ample reasons to conclude that the Framers intended
to prevent the state-by-state patchwork of insolvency regimes that
hindered commerce in the early republic—hence, the mandate for
623
“uniform” bankruptcy laws.
To the extent that bankruptcy in the
United States still resembles a patchwork of insolvency regimes, it is
not, in the plain sense of the word, “uniform.”
To be sure, Congress is not affirmatively required to enact a na624
tional bankruptcy law.
The bankruptcy clause provides that Congress has the power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws, not that
Congress is required to do so. Therefore, when there is no national
bankruptcy law, states may enact their own bankruptcy and insolvency
625
laws.
This shows that absolute bankruptcy equality is not a sacrosanct right of citizenship. Bankruptcy discharge on equal footing for
every person in every state is not a guaranteed component of life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness.
The issue raised in this Article is, when Congress chooses to exercise its bankruptcy power, must the laws enacted pursuant thereto
be uniform in their application to all classes of debtors and creditors
everywhere? Or, can these laws allow for variation in the treatment of
the same classes of debtors and creditors based on geography? The
answer to the latter question is a hard “no” if one agrees with the apparent conclusion of Katz. The answer is a softer “no” if one analo621

Id. at 473.
Id. at 471–73.
623
See supra notes 535–37 and accompanying text.
624
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 230 n.a (1827) (noting that holding that “it is
the exercise of national bankruptcy power, not the mere existence of it,” that gives
Congress exclusive right to legislate bankruptcy law).
625
Brown v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454, 457 (1892).
622
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gizes bankruptcy uniformity with the uniformity standards of the taxing and naturalization powers. Neither of these two powers allows for
express variation based on state law or other geographic considera626
tions, but both of them tolerate regional differences that may indi627
rectly result from the operation of the laws. In contrast, those who
agree with the Moyses geographic uniformity doctrine, as further explicated in Butner, fully accept disproportionate geographic effects in
the operation of national bankruptcy law. For them, bankruptcy
should be a procedural forum to administer state law property
628
rights.
The majority in Katz seems to suggest that the Framers intended
the Bankruptcy Clause to establish personal uniformity in bankrupt629
cy. But the Katz “personal uniformity” standard is not convincing.
The bankruptcy clause does not state that the effect of bankruptcy laws
must be uniform, but rather that the laws must be uniform. A creditor whose security interest under state law includes rent proceeds may
fare better in a bankruptcy case than a creditor in a state where the
laws do not specify that rents are a part of the security interest. But
allowing claims in bankruptcy to reflect property rights existing under state laws at the time the bankruptcy was filed does not violate the
requirement for uniformity in bankruptcy laws.
The Moyses and proceduralist “geographic uniformity” standard
is also unsatisfying. First, there are flaws in the legal logic of the case,
630
as discussed above.
Second, although it is conceptually uncomplicated, geographic uniformity does not account for the concerns that
631
motivated the Framers to create a unified system of commerce.
The rule in Moyses would fully honor state laws that discriminate in
favor of citizens against non-citizens, or that inordinately benefit
business or other interests unique to that state. Third, the lack of
uniformity due to differing property rights, procedural variances, and
key differences in fundamental precedent results in bankruptcy ad626
See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 84 (1900) (“[W]herever a subject is taxed
anywhere, the same must be taxed everywhere throughout the United States, and at
the same rate.”); Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1981) (“While it is true
that Congress has in the past allowed states great latitude with respect to morality,
that latitude cannot be granted when the resulting consistencies undermine a uniform rule of naturalization.”).
627
See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 84 (1983); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S.
351, 357 (1976).
628
Lipson, supra note 545, at 619.
629
See supra notes 589–91 and accompanying text.
630
See supra notes 560–72 and accompanying text.
631
See supra notes 533–38 and accompanying text.
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632

ministration that is inconsistent and haphazard, and which can suffer from the perception that it is unfair.
Finally, to characterize a patchwork system of bankruptcy laws
and procedures that allow for such significantly different outcomes
for similarly-situated debtors and creditors based primarily on where
the case is filed simply stretches the notion of uniformity too far.
“Geographic uniformity” under the Bankruptcy Code is not uniform
under any reasonable definition of that word.
The aspiration in Katz for more robust fidelity to bankruptcy
uniformity can be harmonized with the excessive deference to state
law displayed in Moyses and Butner. When a debtor files a bankruptcy
petition, the crucial baseline for treatment of creditors is the sched633
ules of assets, liabilities, and other documents filed by the debtor.
Bankruptcy is said to create a “snapshot” of the debtor’s financial sit634
uation as of the moment of filing. Up to that point, the debtor’s assets and liabilities—and hence, its relationships with creditors—have
been established and governed under non-bankruptcy law. There is
no reason to disregard the rights and obligations of the parties as
they have been fixed by non-bankruptcy law prior to filing. In fact, to
do so would require creating a body of federal common law of property. This “snapshot” is therefore the set of rights held by creditors at
the commencement of the bankruptcy, which the debtor must address. This may result in non-uniformity of the rights held by parties
in different states when the bankruptcy commences, but it is based on
non-bankruptcy law and therefore cannot constitute “non-uniform”
bankruptcy law.
Once the case is filed, however, bankruptcy law comes into effect
in that it modifies the rights and obligations of the parties post-filing.
Some examples include the automatic stay, rejection of contracts,
curing of defaults, modification of loan terms, modification of liens,
priorities of distribution of assets to creditors, discharge of the debt635
or, and other powers. Post-filing, the laws passed by Congress that

632

Jackson, supra note 430, at 907.
11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2006).
634
See, e.g., In re Orso, 283 F.3d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 2002) ( “[In making decisions,]
the court must take a retrospective ‘snapshot’ of the law and the facts as they stood
on the day the petition was filed.”).
635
See supra note 583 and accompanying text. Professor Thomas E. Plank cautions against over-expanding the range of issues and problems that are subject to the
bankruptcy power. Plank, supra note 543, at 561– 564. Plank asserts that bankruptcy
as understood by the Framers was meant to apply narrowly to the situations when
debtors cannot pay their creditors. Id. at 532. Thus, bankruptcy cannot create det633
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address the debtor-creditor relationship, distribute assets, provide for
discharge, or serve other bankruptcy purposes are under the bankruptcy power and therefore must be uniform. These bankruptcy laws
cannot vary in their effect based on geography.
V. CONCLUSION
By distinguishing between laws that establish the debtor-creditor
relationship up to the moment of bankruptcy, and laws that effect its
modification after the bankruptcy case is filed, we can consider which
laws may permissibly vary based on nonbankruptcy law, local procedures, or other geographic factors, and which laws must be uniform
636
in order to satisfy the uniformity criterion.
It is clear that exemptions in bankruptcy must be the same, regardless of where the debtor
files. Exemptions directly impact what the debtor may retain and
what creditors may recover. This is the clearest example of how a
state can use its laws to favor its citizens to the detriment of non637
citizens.
A close second is the difference in state ipso facto laws.
Evidence conclusively shows that debtors in states that permit enforcement of ipso facto clauses enter into reaffirmation agreements
at a far higher rate than debtors in states that do allow such provisions. There is no reason debtors should be channeled into forgoing
discharge of debt because of where they live. This does not mean
that states have to change their ipso facto or exemption laws, only
that these state laws cannot apply to parties in a bankruptcy case.
riments or benefits for third parties just to have an impact on debtors and creditors
in bankruptcy. Id. at 545.
636
Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918) (“The Federal Constitution . . .
gives Congress the power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy
throughout the United States. . . . While this is true, state laws are thus suspended
only to the extent of actual conflict with the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act
of Congress.” (citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1 How.), 196 (1819))).
637
In 1973, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended the
adoption of uniform federal bankruptcy exemptions. REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON THE
BANKR. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 2, at 125–30 (1973). A
number of commentators have considered the dual federal / state exemptions, and
most are critical of it. See William Houston Brown & Lawrence Ponoroff, A Second
Look at the Proposed Uniform Bankruptcy Exemptions: Tennessee As an Example, 28 U. MEM.
L. REV. 647 (1998) (stating that reasons favoring uniformity in exemptions include
predictability, greater public respect, elimination of incentive for forum shopping
and federal control over policy issues); William Woodward, Exemptions, Opting Out,
and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHIO STATE L.J. 335 (1983) (noting unfairness to creditors
of expansive state exemptions). An opposite view is presented by G. Marcus Cole,
The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 251, 273
(2000). Cole asserts that principles of U.S. federalism favor keeping state law exemptions, and that “forum shopping” is not necessarily bad and in fact rarely happens.
Id. at 236, 272 –273.
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Other state laws, such as laws on subordination of debt, are likewise
not uniform and should not be incorporated into bankruptcy law.
In place of the state laws now used in bankruptcy, bankruptcy
courts can develop a body of federal common law. Doing so would
638
not offend the principle of Erie Railroad. Co. v. Tompkins. Erie held
that courts must apply the law of the forum state in matters not gov639
erned by the federal Constitution or acts of Congress. The diversity
action in Erie is entirely different from a bankruptcy case, which arises
under the federal Bankruptcy Code enacted pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause. Indeed, bankruptcy courts already use federal common law to distinguish between a non-dischargeable domestic support order and other types of dischargeable family debt, which are
640
both created under state law.
Because federal common law and
state law are both “nonbankruptcy law,” the Code sections that mention nonbankruptcy law will not have to be re-written. For example,
§510(a) provides that a subordination agreement is enforceable in
bankruptcy to the same extent it would be under nonbankruptcy
641
law.
At present, state law is used to determine enforceability of a
642
subordination agreement.
Federal courts could establish national
criteria as to the form, content, and other requirements for enforceability of such agreements. By doing so, creditors with an interest in
property subject to a subordinate agreement will be treated the same
irrespective of where the bankruptcy case is filed.
Another key cause of nonuniformity in bankruptcy is case law
precedent. This is a natural consequence of the federal court system
and is not due to a lack of uniform bankruptcy laws. But consideration for uniformity should be an active component of judicial decision-making in bankruptcy. As noted, the lack of uniformity is the
most common reason why the Supreme Court accepts certiorari.
Lower courts should consider uniformity with equal reverence.
Local rules, forms, standing orders, and trustee procedures that
create discernible differences in how bankruptcy applies to parties
638

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 78 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.”).
640
See Brody v. Brody (In re Brody), 3 F.3d 35, 38 (2nd Cir. 1993) (“[T]he label
that the parties attach to a payment is not dispositive; the court must look to the substance, and not merely the form, of the payments.”); Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that a domestic support obligation is a determination made in accordance with federal bankruptcy law, not state
law).
641
11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2006).
642
See supra notes 250–57.
639
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undermine uniformity too because they invest local courts and officials with discretion to distinguish among parties in bankruptcy. The
Bankruptcy Clause allows laws that distinguish between classes of
debtors and creditors, but it does not allow anyone other than Congress to make those laws. At the very minimum, all local Chapter 13
plan forms should be abolished, as should local trustee practices that
have unique requirements for establishing things such as property
values and charitable contributions. They should be replaced by a
single national Chapter 13 form and national guidelines for essential
bankruptcy functions. In addition, it is hard to justify so many local
Chapter 13 trustee practices and commission rates. Chapter 13 debtors should pay the same trustee commission rate, under the same
terms, regardless of where they file. Local standing orders, which are
issued without the procedural requirements of local bankruptcy rules
but have the same effect of local bankruptcy rules, should also be
abolished. These steps will go far in eliminating nonuniform bankruptcy outcomes that are based on geography.

